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INCENTIVIZING DIVORCE

Andrea B. Carroll*
Incentives are a powerful thing. They suggest acceptable social
and moral conduct, guide our behavior, shape our decision-making
process, and often even spur us to action. In the legal sphere, an
incentive is a favored tool of the lawmaker, one that he might use in a
normative fashion to bring about a certain course of conduct.1 And
even when society fails to act on the incentives created by its laws, the
incentives serve a valuable expressive purpose. They convey the
lawmakers ' desired message and provide aid in shaping societal views
of certain legal institutions.2
Perhaps nowhere in the law is this hortatory, expressive bent more
apparent than in the family law domain.3 Often, there is no real legal
remedy available for the breach of obligations set out in laws regulating
the family. 4 And even when family law rules are enforceable, the
possibility of compulsion is often less significant than the normative
component of the rule.5 Law is used as a symbolic tool in family law.6
In the area of child support, for instance, the image of the "deadbeat
dad" and the legal consequences associated with such a status are
instructive. 7 Certainly, the law provides a whole host of avenues for the
collection of child support, including the garnishment of wages, a
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I Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996)
(describing law as a "norm manager").
2 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86

VA. L. REV. 190 l (2000).

3 Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991,

1004.

4 Scott, supra note 2, at 1929.

5 Id. at 1929.
6 Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law

Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225, 237 (2004) (discouraging

harmful social marital institutions is a necessary component of a "marriage law that actively
reflects and communicates shared norms about marriage").

7 Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in Shaping Social Perspectives

on Marriage, 3 J.L. & FAM. ST UD 23, 29 (2001).
.
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relaxation of the typical rules of civil procedure to aid a party in
collecting arrearages, and suspension of professional and other licenses
of the obligor for nonpayment.8 But our lawgivers conjure the image of
the deadbeat dad to send a message.9 The vast majority of child support
in arrearages, for which a party may need to use the enforcement
mechanisms detailed above, will never be collected.10 The avenues for
collection exist, not solely for the purpose of aiding the collection of
child support, but also to bring society to see the moral obligation of the
debtor spouse to pay that support.1 1

The legal rules of child support

serve an important purpose, regardless of whether they are ever
enforced. 12

In this norm-shaping sense, the rules of family law are expected to
bear a rather hefty burden.

Here more than in other legal arenas, law

must send a strong message.13 Society has an interest in seeing its rules
punish reprehensible familial conduct and encourage responsible and
beneficial behavior.14

In the context of the spousal relationship,

specifically, divorce is likely to be among the conduct most strongly
discouraged by the lawmaker.

That this would be so is not surprising

when one considers the societal cost of divorce. It has been estimated
that a single divorce costs the public roughly $30,000 and that the
annual cost of divorce to the American taxpayers approaches $30

billion. is

On the other hand, the economic and other benefits of

marriage both on the spouses themselves, and on society at large, have
been well-documented for many years.16
It is somewhat surprising, then, to find that the rules governing
married parties' conduct toward each other provide a number of rather
strong incentives to spouses to terminate their marital relationship at the
earliest moment possible. Legal rules that either favor or disadvantage
married persons are not difficult to find. They exist across all areas of

8 See generally Jonathan S. Jemison, Collecting and Enforcing Child Support Orders 1ri1'1
the Internal Revenue Service: An Analysis of a Novel Idea, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 137. 138
(1999) (describing various state and federal schemes to enforce child support obl igations).
9 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 29.
10 Adam Clymer, Child-Support Collection Net Usually Fails. N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997. at
Al6.
11 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 29.
12 Id.

!3 Weisbrod, supra note 3, at 994 ("[W]e look at law because it can and ought to be used to
teach specific things.").

14 See generally Jane C.

Murphy ,

Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children. The

New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60

15

U. PITT. L.

REV. 1111 ( 1999).

Rutgers University, The National Marriage Project, The State of' Our Unions. p. 22 (July

2007). This cost estimate is "based on such things as the high er use of food stamps and public
housing as well as increased bankruptcies and juvenile delinquency." Id.
16 Id. (noting that married couples "create more economic assets on average" because of

a

"wealth-generation bonus" and that both divorce and unmarried childbearing "increase child
poverty").
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Indeed, the United States Government Accountability Office

recently identified more than one thousand legal rules which provided
for either penalties or subsidies to married persons in the federal
government arena alone. 1 s Rules which do not serve to benefit married
persons, but instead incentivize divorce might be justifiable, or at the
very least understandable, when they come about because of a necessary
conflict in two vastly different areas of law.

Thus, where the rules

regarding illegal immigration and family law collide, it is easy to
understand that one rule

may have the unfortunate,

and wholly

unintended, effect of incentivizing divorce.19 Even within the sphere of
family regulation, however, legal scholars have recognized perverse
divorce incentives.

One scholar has noted that the American Law

Institute ' s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, in choosing to
focus solely on financial aspects of the marital relationship and in the
meantime ignoring the spou ses' emotional ties, "endorse divorce."20
Even more egregious is the notion that a number of rules of marital
property, that area in which one might expect the law to be most
protective of marriage, actually leave spouses better off divorced. This
article focuses on precisely those pushes toward divorce, highlighting
three of the most disturbing divorce incentives provided by rules of
marital property.
Part I will explore the incentives one spouse living under a
community property regime has to seek divorce in order to better her
position vis-a-vis creditors of the other spouse.

A rule of marital

property that allows creditors to seize more of the spouses' property
after divorce than was permissible during the marriage pushes spouses
toward divorce.

Part II focuses on the failure of most states' laws to

provide a spouse with a much-needed unilateral method of terminating
the marital property regime, yet remaining married. Part III examines a

17 A great number of provisions of law not detailed here provide spouses with rather
substantial incentives to divorce.

Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage
and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 9 (1990) ("Although divorce typically imposes formidable
psychological and economic costs, there are few legal incentives to remain married, or even to
consider thoughtfully the decision to end the marriage."). See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Pren uptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 396
(sunset provisions in matrimonial agreements); Douglas W. Allen, The Effect on Divorce of
Legislated Net-Wealth Transfers, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 580 (2007) (child support guidelines);
David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent, 47
ARIZ. L. REV. 313 (2005) (narrow citizenship rule); Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys
Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in Postin dustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1877 (1999)
(shift toward equal sharing in breadwinning responsibilities).
!8 SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 76 (Shoshana
Grossbard-Shechtrnan ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
19 See generally lssacson, supra note I 7.
20 Katherine Baird Slibaugh, Money as Emotion in the Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in
RECONCETVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW !NSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF

THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 243 (Robin Wilson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).

[Vol. 30:5
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rule, not precisely of marital property, but rather of preemption of state
marital

property

Congressional

Specifically,

rules.

retirement plans,

governing

legislation

at least as that legislation has been

interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, provides a rather strong
divorce incentive in that it precludes the application of state marital
property rules allowing a nonparticipant spouse with an interest in a
community pension to make a testamentary transfer of her interest upon
death.21

After exploring each of these divorce incentives in detail, Part

IV offers some observations as to why marital property rules that
incentivize divorce are so disturbing.
Many existing marital property rules simply send the wrong
message

about

regime.22

and

both marriage

the

spouses'

marital

property

And even if no empirical evidence can be mustered to

demonstrate that these incentives actually

cause

divorce,23 a shift in

If the substantive marital

thinking is desperately needed in this area.

property rules that incentivize divorce are not reversed entirely, then, at
a minimum, lawmakers and legal scholars must begin an exploration of
whether the consequences of each of these three marital property rules
justify their costs.

Quite simply, these marital property rules do more

harm than good.

They make divorce a more attractive option for

married couples than continuing their marriage.

And worse yet, they

send an inept and unrepresentative message about the value of the
marital relationship.

I.

THE NARROWING OF CREDITOR ACCESS TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY
AFTER DIVORCE

Marital property rules, particularly those of community property
regimes,24 sometimes provide couples a powerful incentive to divorce to
U.S.
Boggs v. B oggs,
d l
U.S.C.A. §
21
22 The strong benefits of marriage to both society as a whole and the individual parties to it

833 (1997).

520

1056( )( ) (2006);

29

would lead one to believe that lawmakers would strive to "strengthen the foundation of marriage
as a social institution by encouraging commitment to its success." Brotherson & Teichert. supra
at
note

7, 50.

23 Of course, there is no empirical evidence which demonstrates that these rules of marital
property cause spouses who otherwise would have remained married to act otherwise.
24 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington have
long been community property states. J. Mark Weiss, Community
Property Interests in Separate
Property Businesses in Washington,
GONZ L. REV.
(citing Nathan R. Long.
Community Characterization of the Increased Value
IDAHO
of Separately Owned Businesses,
L. REV.
see also Angela M. Bradstreet, Marital Property La11· in
gland and Califor ia: A Comparative Study and Critique,
HASTINGS !NT L & COMP. L. REV.
�
.
W1sconsm
became the last Amencan state to adopt a manta! property regime
that �s considered "community" with its
enactme nt of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act
heavdy based on the Uniform Marital
Property A ct-in
See Howard S. Erlanger & June
_
M. Weisberg
er, From Common Law Property to
Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital

40

.

205, 207 (2004)

32

�;

731, 75�-61, 765 (1996));

4

3, 143 (1�80).
_

1986.

�
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Specifically, a nondebtor

improve their position relative to creditors.

spouse will have substantially more protection from the creditors of the
debtor spouse if the marriage is terminated than he would have if the
marriage remains intact.

This bizarre incentive to divorce results from

the existence of marital property rules in some jurisdictions that insulate
the

nondebtor

spouse's

property-only

after

divorce-for

debts

incurred by the other spouse.
The basic principle of the community property regime as it relates
to debt collection is that all, or vir tually all, of the community property
of married persons is available for creditors of either spouse to seize in
order to satisfy a debt incurred by either spouse during marriage. 25
There are certainly exceptions.

Some states limit the seizeable

community property to that within the management and control of the
debtor spouse. 26

And some states allow seizure of the entirety of the

community property only if the debt at issue is one incurred for the
benefit of the community.27 Further, some states insulate certain limited
pieces of nondebtor property, such as the nondebtor spouse's earnings.28
Still, it can hardly be disputed that the community property regime is
exceptionally creditor friendly.29

It makes far more property available

to creditors for seizure than does the separate property regime.30
Typically,

the community property regime's

creditor

bent carries

forward even beyond divorce and continues to give creditors pervasive

Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 769, 769-71 (1990).
25 See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007); C AL FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2007)
.

(entirety of the community property may be seized for a debt incurred by either spouse during
marriage in Louisiana and California). Both states allow even premarital creditors of a spouse to
seize the entirety of the spouses' community property, though California generally immunizes the
earnings of the nondebtor spouse for premarital debts.

LA C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007);

CAL. FAM. CODE§§ 910(a), 911 (West 2007).
26 These states include Idaho, Nevada, and Texas. See WIL LIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA

A.

SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 426 (6th ed. 2004); Elizabeth De

Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community

Property law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 274 (1995). Idaho case law is unclear.

Its courts have

adopted a managerial approach since the early twentieth century, but have inexplicably, and
perhaps even unintentionally, applied a community debt theory in a few recent cases.

See Erik

Paul Smith, Comment, The Uncertainty of Community Property for the Tortious liabilities of

One of the Spouses: Where the law is Uncertain, There is No law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 799, 81723 (1994).
27 Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin have adopted the community debt
system.

See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 444; De Armond, supra note 26, at 275;

McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d 990, 998 (N.M. 1949).
28 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 911 (West 2007) (insulating nondebtor spouse's wages from
seizure for the prenuptial debt of the other spouse as long as the wages are segregated from other
community property).
29 See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. I (2007).

30 Id. at 4.
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seizure rights. 31
However, at least two community property states-California and
Idaho-deviate from the general community rule on creditor collection
after termination of the marriage in a rather disturbing way.32

These

rules are anomalous, and problematic, because they allow dissolution of
the marriage to narrow the scope of assets available for creditor seizure
from the entirety of the community property during the existence of the
marriage33 to merely the portion of the community property awarded to
the debtor spouse after dissolution.34

The reduction of property

available to creditors for seizure post-dissolution essentially creates an
incentive for spouses to divorce for the protection of the nondebtor
spouse's assets.
The California and Idaho
statutory35

and

the

have different sources-one
other jurisprudential36-and the rationale for

31 This rule is statutory in two states.

rules

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (2007); WIS. STAT.

ANN. § 766.55(2)(c)(2)(2m) (West 2007). In five other community property states, the rule is
jurisprudential. Community Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. App. Div. I
1995); Marine M i dland Bank v. Monroe, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988);

Moucka

v.

Windham, 483 F.2d 914, 916-917 (10th Cir. 1973); Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston. 598 S.W.2d
321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Watters v. Doud, 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981);

see also

Mont E. Tanner, Twin Falls Bank & Trust v. Holley: Restricting Creditors' Rights under

a

Property Settlement Agreement--A Departure that Sets Ohio Apart, 26 IDAHO L . REV. 595, 600

(1990); Lamont C. Loo, Contractual Creditor Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Re1·isiti11g
Twin Falls Bank & Trust v. Holley, Proposal: A Tripartite Analvsis, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 777. 782
(1994).
The rationale behind the post-termination collection rule in most states is essentially that
property which could have been seized as community property during marriage should maintain
that same status after divorce. See Loo, supra, at 788. In most cases, this policy has an equitable
justification. When a creditor contracts with a married person, he forms expectations based upon
the asset base of the entire community. To allow a spouse to frustrate those creditor expectations
by divorce would be inequitable to the creditor. No such equitable argument based on creditor
expectations exists in jurisdictions that allow seizure of the spouses' community property for the
premarital debt of one of the spouses, however. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 43-46.
32 While California and Idaho are the only two states that allow virtually no seizure of former
community property in the bands of the nondebtor spouse after divorce, other states restrict post
termination collection from the nondebtor spouse.

For example, in Washington and Wisconsin.

while a creditor can seize former community property in the hands of either spouse, that access
does not extend to any equity in the asset that has accrued after termination of the marriage.
Watters v. Doud 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 766.55(2)(c)(2)(2m) (West
2007) ("Marital property assigned to each spouse under [the dissolution] decree is available for
the satisfaction of such an obligation to the extent of the value of the marital property at the date
of the decree."). Furthermore, in Louisiana, a spouse may, by written act, assume responsibility
for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2357 (2007). Such

an

assumption allows the assuming spouse to dispose of former community

property without incurring further liability for obligations incurred by the other spouse. id.
33 Loo, supra note 31, at 780 (divorce does not affect a creditor's right to seize property post
termination, but merely the quantity of the property accessible to the creditor).
34 CAL. FAM. CODE§ 751 (West 2007) ("The respective interests of the husband and wife in
community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal
interests."); IDAHO CODE § 32-7I2(1)(a) (West 2007) (providing for a "substantially equal
division in value" unless there are "compelling reasons" to otherwise allocate property).
35 CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916(a)(2) (West 2007).
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narrowing the scope of creditor seizure powers after dissolution is
slightly different in each state.

At least one important common thread

does exist, however. Neither state considered, at the time its rule was
enacted or even since, what effect the rule might have in the way of
incentivizing divorce. And neither state has taken any step to reduce the
divorce incentives caused by the rules, or even to study the matter in
sufficient depth to come to the conclusion that the rules are well
justified despite the divorce incentives they provide.

A.

California's Rule

Family Code section 916, which became effective on January 1,
1985,37 is the source of the rule limiting post-dissolution creditor
collection efforts in California. That section provides:
The separate property owned by a married person at the time of the
division and the property received by the person in the division is not
liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before or during
marriage, and the person is not personally liable for the debt, unless
the debt was assigned for payment by the person in the division of
the property.

Nothing in this paragraph affects the liability of

property for the satisfaction of a lien on the property.38

The rule is a significant one because it is distinct from the
California rule of creditor access to the community property of spouses
in an intact marriage. 39 Creditors seeking satisfaction of debts incurred
"before or during marriage" may freely seize the California spouses'
community property, regardless of which spouse incurred the debt and
regardless of the rights of the spouses to manage the property subject to
seizure.40

Perhaps even more importantly, section 916 represents a

36 Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (1986).
37 When the rule described here became effective in 1985 , it was California Civil Code

section 5120.160. It was moved to the Family Code in 1994, thought the change was not
substantive. Law Revision Commission Comments, CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916 (West 2007).
38 C A . FAM. CODE § 916(a)(2) (West 2007). The community property that passes to the
fonner spouse is not immunized when a lien has been placed on the former community property.

Id. Even a lien from a judicial mortgage caused merely by recordation of a judgment before a
division of property has occurred would subject the nondebtor spouse to the rights of the creditor
under the lien. WILLIAM BASSETT, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 9:48 (West
2007). See also Lezine

v.

Sec. Pac. Fin, 925 P.2d 1002, 1006-!007 (Cal. 1996).

39 Compare CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916(a)(2) (West 2007) with CAL. FAM. CODE§ 910(a) (West

2007). See also B A SSETT, supra note 38 ("Thus, the principles of liability of community property
during marriage are not applicable after division of the property upon dissolution.").
4° C AL . FAM. CODE§ 910(a) (West 2007). This statute expressly defines "during marriage"
to exclude periods of physical separation that precede a legal separation or judgment of divorce.

Id. at§ 910(b); see also BASSETT, supra note 38 ("'during marriage' lasts until separation, not
final judgment"); S. Brett Sutton & Lee A. Miller, Civil Code Section 5120. I IO(c): California 's
New Approach to Postseparation Obligations, 23 PAC. L. J. 107 (1991) (describing the precursor
section to California Family Code article 910(b)). But see supra note 112 (restriction on creditor

[Vol. 30:�
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change

from

prior

which

j urisprudence,41

California

had

rather

uniformly held that the entirety of the former community property may
be seized by creditors even after divorce.42
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had

916 in a bankruptcy case
of In re Chenich, Mr. and

occasion to interpret the provisions o f section
rather quickly after its passage.

In the case

Mrs. Chenich were physically separated, but not yet divorced, when Mr.
Chenich was involved in a car accident.4 3 Shortly after Mr. and Mrs.
Chenich's divorce became final, the victim of the accident received
judgment against Mr. Chenich in the amount of

$1. 7

m illion.44

a

A

number of Mr. Chenich ' s post-divorce assets were seized in satisfaction
of the debt, but those assets were not sufficient to fully satisfy the
judgment, and Mr. Chenich filed a personal bankruptcy petition one
year after he and Mrs. Chenich divorced.4 5 Mr. Chenich died before the
debt was fully satisfied.46

The trustee in bankruptcy then sued Mrs.

Chenich, arguing that she was required to relinquish the property she
received in the community property settlement, either because it was
seizable for Mr. Chenich's debt or because it was transferred to her
fraudulently.47 Thus, the court was required to confront the scope of the

access for prenuptial debts).

41 BASSETT, supra note 38; see also Law Revision Commission Comments, CAL FAM. COOi:

§ 916 (West 2007).

42 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Mantz, 49 P.2d 279 (1935) (judgment
see also

creditor could seize former community property in the hands of a nondebtor spouse);

Head v. Crawford, 202 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 984); Gould v. Fuller, 5 7 Cal. Rptr. 2.1
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Greene v. Wilson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 962); Harley
v. Whitmore, 51 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin.
Serv., Inc., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d I 16, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. I 995),

affd, 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996); M.I'.

Allen General Contractors, Inc. v. Kervin, 2002 WL 265060 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Liahi/i11
.

ofMarital Property for Debts, 17 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports

l, 22 (1984).

43 87 B.R. 101, 1 03 (BAP 9th Cir. 1988).

44 Id. See also In re Braendle, 46 Cal. App. 4th I 03 7 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1996). In Braendle.

the husband was awarded community stock at the dissolution of marriage and was ordered to pay
his former wife an equalizing payment, which the court ruled was to be secured by the stock. JJ
at 1040.

Husband was also allocated a $58,000 debt to American Overseas (the husband's

airfreight company, the stock of which he was allocated at partition).

Id. The issue presented in

the case was whether the former wife or American Overseas, both creditors of husband, had

�'

Id. at 1041. The court noted that the broad rule of creditor acces� tn
community property is modified when the parties divorce and California Family Code § l) I (1
becomes applicable. Id. at 1042 (quoting the California Law Revision Commission's comments
on intent of the provision (see inr
f a, note 59)). Because the debt here was not assigned to the·
priority interest in the stock.

wife, the court held that § 916 prevents the seizure of her former community property for ih
satisfaction.

Id. American Overseas could seize the stock in husband-debtor's hands, but wik

had priority as a secured creditor. Id. at 1 045.
45 In re Chenich, 87 B.R. at 103.

46 Id.
47 Id. Under the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee could avoid the'
transfer of property by Mr. Chenich if the transfer could have been avoided under California la\1.
Id. at 104.

1933
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liability of a nondebtor spouse's former community property.48
The court noted that California law changed radically in 1985 to
insulate the property a nondebtor spouse receives in divorce.49 The
change from full accessibility of former community property under the
pre-1985 law was necessary, according to the court, because of serious
tracing and valuation problems that existed under the old law.50 Thus,
relying on section 916, the court found the former community property
Mrs. Chenich received in divorce free from seizure for the debts Mr.
Chenich incurred during their marriage.51
California has given rather broad application to the policies
effectuated by section 916. In addition to In re Chenich, the statute has
been applied in a number of cases since its passage to restrict creditor
access to both the nondebtor spouse's former community and separate
property.52 And California courts have even held that the statute applies
to restrict a creditor's collection efforts if the debt at issue was incurred
before the section's 1985 effective date, so long as a collection attempt
was made after it came into effect. 53
The rule carries such an obvious and negative suggestion to

48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See, infra, text accompanying notes 54-60.
51 In re Chenich, 87 B.R. at 104.
52 See, e.g., M.P. Allen General Contractors, Inc.

v.

Kervin, 2002 WL 265060, at *2 (Cal. Ct.

See generally
1999), disapproved of on other grounds by

App. 2002); Stewart v. Edmunds, 2002 WL 192911, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Gagan v. Gouyd, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (Cal. Ct. App.

Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169 (Cal. 2003); In re Marriage of Braendle, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin. Serv., Inc., 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996).
53 CAL. FAM. CODE § 930 (West 2007) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, this part
governs the liability of separate property and property in the community estate and the personal

I , 1985, regardless of whether
see also American Olean Tile Co. v.

liability of a married person for a debt enforced on or after January
the debt was incurred before, on, or after that date.");

Schultze, 169 Cal. App. 3d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (wife's former community property not
seizable for satisfaction of business-related promissory note signed by husband while spouses
were separated at the time the note was signed and husband was allocated the business upon
divorce). In

American Olean Tile, the husband executed a promissory note the month before the
Id. at 362.

spouses' marital property settlement was incorporated into a judgment of divorce.

The court dispensed with the fact that California Civil Code sections 5120.160 and 5120.320
(now California Family Code sections 916 and 930) were meant to apply only after divorce by
holding that under California Civil Code section 5118 (now California Family Code section 771),
both the husband's income and obligations incurred in the operation of a separate property
business were not community assets or liabilities.

Id. at 364. Under the California jurisprudence,

the execution of the marital settlement agreement, which was executed before the promissory
note, transmuted the community property business into the separate property of the husband.

Id.

Furthermore, once the transmutation occurred, any creditor seeking to enforce a business debt
incurred thereafter was restricted to enforcement from the separate property of the debtor spouse,
provided that the agreement was not entered into to defraud the creditor and the creditor was not
misled as to the nature of any assets that the creditor relies upon.

Id.

The court upheld the

retroactivity of sections 5120.160 and 5120.320 (now California Family Code sections 916 and
930, respectively), given that equitable distribution of marital property is a significant state
interest.

Id. at 367.
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spouses about how to best avoid their creditors that 1t 1s somewhat
surprising that the California legislative history does not reveal a single
The California
discussion of the perverse incentives it creates.
legislature, in studying its pre- 1 985 rule of full community property
liability after divorce, viewed the scheme as one rife with both
pragmatic and theoretical problems. 54
difficult one because of the tracing

Practically, the rule was a

issues

it necessarily raised.

Questions arose, for instance, as to whether increases in the value of
former community property should b e seizable, and whether liability
should follow former community property if it changed in form after
termination.55 Theoretically, the California legislature was troubled by
the notion that a nondebtor could be held liable for another' s debt after
divorce, when the very purpose of allocation of debts upon divorce is to
designate a particular person from whom the creditor can satisfy his
claim-typically, his debtor. 56 After much consideration, the legislature
determined that, after a marriage has terminated, it is typically "unwise
to continue the liability of spouses for community debts incurred by
5 Thus, the rule was changed to hold only the former
former spouses. " 7
community property in the hands of the spouse who i s allocated the debt
in a community property partition to be seizable by creditors. 58 The
legislature's intent was that "in allocating the debts to the parties, the
court in the dissolution proceeding should take into account the rights of
creditors so there will be available sufficient property to satisfy the debt
by the person to whom the debt is assigned, provided the net division is
equal."59 The section effectively does exactly what the California
legislature intended; i t immunizes "the nondebtor spouse from liability
as to former community property awarded to him . . . on dissolution . " 60

B.

Idaho 's Rule

I daho's rule is far less clear than California' s, largely because the
rule is not statutory.

Rather, the Idaho post-dissolution seizure rule is

one that comes from the state' s jurisprudence, which, on this point, is
tortured at best .
The first Idaho case to set out the rule that creditor collection
attempts are limited to the debtor spous e ' s interest in the former
community property after divorce was

Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co.

54 See Comm'n Reports, supra note 42, at23.
55 Id
56 Id
57 Dawes v. Rich. 60 Ca l. App. 4th 24 , 30 (C a l. Ct. App. l 997).
58 Ci\L.FAM.CODE§916(West2007).
-'9
s·C'l' C omm n R eports, supra note 42, at23 - 24.
60 B !\SSFTT, supm note 38.
'
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Holley.61 In that case, Mr. Holley signed a $125,000 promissory note
for a loan related to his construction business while he was physically
separated, but not yet divorced, from his wife.62 The note became due
after the spouses were officially divorced, but rather than requiring Mr.
Holley to pay the note when it became due, the creditor, Twin Falls
Bank & Trust, executed an extension agreement with Mr. Holley which
gave him almost an additional two months to pay.63 Mr. Holley failed
to repay the loan when the extended due date passed and thereafter filed
for b ankruptcy.64

After collection efforts against him proved fruitless,

Twin Falls sued Mrs. Holley, seeking to seize her former community
property to satisfy the outstanding balance on the note.65

Mrs. Holley

argued that Twin Falls was required to limit itself to the property held
by Mr. Holley for satisfaction of a debt it contracted solely with him.66
Before turning to the resolution of Twin Falls' claim against Mrs.
Holley, the Idaho Supreme Court first articulated the general rules that
apply in Idaho when creditors try to collect from a spouse living under a
community property regime.

The court noted that creditors contract

with members of the marital community individually, because the
community itself is not a legal entity.67

Therefore, the property

available to creditors for seizure depends largely upon whether they
contract with one or both of the spouses. 68 If the creditor contracts with
only one of the spouses, only that spouse's separate property is seizable
for the debt; the nondebtor spous e ' s separate property remains free from
liability.69 However, the entirety of the community property is available
for seizure regardless of whether one or both spouses contracts the
debt.70 In essence, then, "the community property system merely makes

61 7 23 P. 2d 893 ( 1986).
62 Id. at 895.
63 Id. at 895.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.

67 Id. at 896 ("The marital community is not a legal entity such as a business partnership or
corporation. ").
68 Id.

Whether a creditor contracts with one spouse or both spouses jointly affects only the

availability of separate property of either spouse to satisfy the debt, since a creditor's seizure of
community property is not dependent upon both spouses incurring the debt.
accompanying notes 25-30.
69 This rule is statutory in origin. Idaho Code§ 32-912 (2 008) provides:

See supra text

Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the
community property , and either may bind the community property by contract . . . and
any community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the spouse
who did not so consent. . . .

But see Loo, supra note 31, at 783, 785-86 (criticizing "community obligation " language of the
statute as erroneously suggesting that Idaho is a community debt rather than a managerial system
state).

70 Holley, 7 23 P.2d at 895-96.
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additional resources [beyond what would be available to a creditor in a
separate property jurisdiction] (community property) available to a
creditor from which to seek satisfaction of an unpaid debt. "7 1
The court viewed the creditor' s position in this case a s altered,
however, when Mr. and Mrs. Holley divorced. The precise language of
the opinion here is important, as it seems to expand upon prior Idaho
j urisprudence in a way that has significant implications for the rules of
creditor collection in Idaho. In articulating a rule of creditor access to
property after divorce, the court stated:
Absent allegations of . . . contractual liability, a creditor may not,
with one exception, proceed against community assets distributed to
[a nondebtor spouse] pursuant to a divorce decree.

The sole

exception to this rule was set forth in our case of Spoka.ne
Merchants ' Ass 'n
pursuant to

Olmstead. 72

v.

divorce

In that case, we held that where,

proceedings,

one

member

of the

marital

community is responsible for a community obligation but is not
awarded sufficient community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor
may properly seek satisfaction for the debt from community property
distributed to the other spouse. Essentially, the holding of Spoka.ne
Merchants ' Ass 'n

v.

Olmstead, supra, i s that members of the marital

community may not utilize divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud
on creditors of the community.73

Finding no e vidence of a fraudulent transfer or insufficiency of
assets at the time of the transfer, the court dismissed Twin Fall s ' suit
against Mrs. Holley. 74
The Holley court ' s basic articulation of the result in a prior Idaho

7 1 Id. at 896.
72 327 P.2d 385 ( 1 958).
73 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897. The court's language is interesting, as it implies that a divorce
settlement transferring insufficient assets to a debtor spouse is necessarily one that perpetrates a
"fraud" on creditors. Asset insufficiency and fraud are certainly di stinct concepts, and the
language appears somewhat erroneous. However, in the fraudulent transfer context, these
concepts are often intermingled. It is typically asset insufficiency that amounts to the only
outward proof that a "fraud" occurred. See Amanda Barkey, Note, The Application of
Con:;tructive Fraud to Divorce Property Settlements: What 's Fraud Got to do With it?, 52
WAYNE L. REY. 22 1 , 226 (2006) (describing the development of "constructive fraud" in marital
property transfers). Given the difficulty of proving the presence of actual fraud upon a creditor,
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act incorporates constructive fraud, which exists when: I) a
transfer was made by the debtor; 2 ) for less than reasonably equivalent value; and 3) the debtor
was insolvent at the time of transfer, or was made insolvent by the transfer. Id.
Although not mentioned in Spokane Merchants ' Ass 'n, its rule does not apply to
community realty subj ect to an encumbrance. Under Idaho Code section 32-9 1 2, both spouses
must sign and acknowledge an instrument of encumbrance in order to properly encumber
community realty. IDAHO CODE § 32-9 1 2 (West 2007); see also Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 779
P.2d 22. 25 (Ct. App. Idaho 1 989).
74 Holley, 723 P.2d at 898. The court did not reach the issue of the whether the "extension
agreement" the husband entered into after divorce bound the wife because the bank did not offer
any evidence indicating that husband was awarded insufficient assets from which to satisfy the
_judgment. Id. at 896.
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case, Spokane Merchants ' Ass 'n, 75 is correct. The Spokane Merchants '
court did allow a creditor to reach the former community property of a
nondebtor wife-specifically, land conveyed to her in a divorce
settlement-after the marriage terminated in divorce. 7 6 But the context
in which the creditor's right to seize that property was granted is
important. The court in Spokane Merchants ' noted that the question
there was whether property awarded to a nondebtor spouse after a
divorce and settlement agreement is "subject to the payment of
community debts incurred prior to such settlement and decree."77 In
finding that the creditor could seize the land wife held by virtue of the
divorce decree, the Spokane Merchants ' court relied heavily on the fact
that the assets the debtor-husband took in divorce were insufficient to
pay the community debts and cited Idaho's version of the fraudulent
transfer laws.78 Specifically, the court noted that transfers, including
those between husband and wife, cannot be effective under Idaho law if
they are perfected "with intent to delay or defraud any creditor."79 The
Holley court was correct, then, in noting that Spokane Merchants '
prevents spouses from divorcing "to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of
the community."8 0
The problem is that Holley sets out a "general rule" of post
termination creditor collection that Spokane Merchants ' does not.
Spokane Merchants ' does not clearly detail a general rule preventing
creditors from seizing the former community property of the nondebtor
spouse. The court there simply held that a divorce and attendant
settlement agreement does not place the property awarded to the
nondebtor out of the hands of the creditor in cases of fr audulent transfer,
or debtor retention of assets amounting to a zero value.81 In other
75
76
77
78
79

327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1 958).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 388.
Id.

Spokane Merchants ', 327 P.2d at 388. Under IDAHO CODE § 55-906 (West 2007) (voiding

any transfer of property with intent to delay or defraud any creditor), the burden of proof rests on

See generally Kester v. Adams, 85 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1936). But see
B. Brown Co. v. Goff, 403 P.2d 855 (1965) (although the burden of establishing fraud is

the party alleging the fraud.
Chester

on the party alleging the fraud, it shifts to those seeking to uphold the transaction when numerous
badges of fraud exist).

80 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897.
81 Id. ; see also Tanner, supra note 31, at 595-96 (unclear in Spokane Merchants ' whether

facts evidencing a fraudulent conveyance were a "necessary prerequisite for the creditor to pursue
the former community property" in the hands of the nondebtor spouse).
As authority for the proposition that a transfer between spouses can be voided if it defrauds

Spokane Merchants ' court relied on Bank of Orofino v. Wellman, 143 P. 1169
Bank of Orofino, creditors of Mr. Wellman attached and levied a judgment upon the
separate property house and land of Mrs. Wellman (in which the spouses lived). Id. at 1169.
creditors, the
(1914). In

Mrs. Wellman argued that the attachment was a cloud on her title; her husband argued that
improvements made to the property out of community funds were also her separate property, as
the improvements were a gift to his wife. Id. at 117 1 . The court found that the transfer was not
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words, Spokane Merchants ' could be read to retain the creditor' s right
to seize the entirety

of the former community property for the

unsatisfied debt of one spouse in all cases, with an even stronger
rationale for doing so in cases involving fraudulent transfers or
insufficient retention of assets by the debtor. 82 A number of community
property states ' rules provide for just such a solution. 83
The interesting l anguage in Holley, then, is that portion of the
opinion in which the court states that "[a]bsent allegations of . . .
contractual liability, a creditor may not, with one exception, proceed
against community assets distributed to [a nondebtor spouse] pursuant
to a divorce decree. "84
opinion.

This is the central language of the Holley

It is the language that is important to the resolution of the

controversy between Twin Falls Bank and Mrs. Holley, since the facts
of that case apparently did not raise the issue of insufficiency of assets
or fraudulent transfer. And this general principle that a creditor ' s p ost
divorce access to former community property is limited to that in the
hands of the debtor spouse absent special circumstances is what
subsequent commentators seem to agree that the Holley decision stands
for.85
What is surprising about the court ' s resolution of this question is
that the rule the court sets out has no prior basis in Idaho law. The court
cites no authority for the rule it applies, save the possible exception of
Spokane Merchants '.

But earlier Idaho cases, including Spokane

Merchants ', simply don ' t set out a rule of creditor access to the

nondebtor's

portion

of

the

former

community

property

absent

a llegations of fraudulent transfer or transferor asset insufficiency .86 To
resolve the dispute presented in the Holley case, it may have been
necessary for the court to issue a legal ruling on a matter of first
impression-the scope of creditor access to former community property
absent an alleged fraudulent transfer.

What is disturbing, however, i s

that the court fails to expressly, or even impliedly, recognize what a
significant step the creation of this rule amounts to, particularly since it

intended to defraud the Bank, since at the time the gift was made, the husband did not have any
indebtedness to existing creditors.

Id.

Thus, husband ' s creditors had no right to seize wife's

separate property in satisfaction of husband's debt. Id. at 1 1 72. Bank

of Orofin o stands for the

proposition that a creditor cannot reach the separate property of the nondebtor spouse absent a
fraudulent transfer. It does little to resolve the question as to whether former community property
in the hands of the nondebtor spouse can be seized absent a fraudulent transfer.
82 Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 604 (arguing that Twin Falls failed to properly distinguish
Spokane M<!rchants · as an insolvency case, and therefore erroneously relied on it as authority).

SJ See supra text accompanying notes 26-3 1 ; see also Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 60 I .
84 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897.
85 One commentator, for instance, remarked that "the court has disregarded the general rule in
other community property states and has articulated new precedent in Idaho." Tanner, supra note
3 L at 608.
86 Spokan<! Merchants ', 327 P.2d 385; see also Bank

of Orofino, 1 43 P. 1 1 69.
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deviates from the rule applied i n a number of other community property
jurisdictions. 87
It

is

perhaps particularly disturbing that

this important, and

anomalous, Idaho rule of reduced creditor access after divorce is set out
against the peculiar Holley b ackdrop.88

It seems

to be another

application of the now axiomatic view among lawyers that "bad facts
make bad law." 89 The Holley court sets out a rule limiting access to
former community property for all creditors of Idaho spouses in the
context o f a case brought by a creditor which had a number o f
opportunities t o collect f r o m and perfect a security interest i n the
debtor's property and failed to do so.90 Moreover, the creditor in Holley
extended the debtor's repayment date, and even signed a new note with
him to represent the new agreement after the marital relationship had
terminated,91 raising questions of whether the extension makes it
appropriate to even consider the nondebtor spouse's liability at all.92 I n
short, there are plenty o f reasons a court might have denied Twin Falls
recovery against Ms. Holley, not the least of which was Twin Falls'
inaction and neglect.

That the Holley case has created the Idaho

precedent reducing all creditors' access to former community property
post-dissolution, even where those creditors are diligent, is troubling.
The novel factual context in which the Holley rule was espoused should
mitigate any scholarly reticence to revisit the rule-either legislatively
or jurisprudentially.93

C.

A Rule Worth Its Negative Message?

Even setting aside the strange Holley background, scholars have
debated the propriety of rules, such as those set out in California and
Idaho, which limit creditor access to former community property upon
87 See supra notes 26-3 1 and accompanying text.
88 In Holley, the Bank had ample opportunity to satisfy its debt from the assets of Mr. Holley;
however, the Bank chose to renegotiate with Mr. Holley, based solely on his post-termination
status and assets. Holley, 723 P.2d at 893, 897. When the Bank lost its interest in his separate
property to Mr. Holley 's bankruptcy trustee, it waited another two years before attempting to
collect the debt from Ms. Holley. Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 608.
89 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 ( 1 992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); In re
Sole, 233 B.R. 347, 349

(E.D.

Va. 1 998); Abcon Assoc., Inc.

v.

United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 678,

690 (200 1 ).
90 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897.
91 Id. at 895.

92 Id.

93 Even though the Holley decision has been a part of the Idaho jurisprudence for more than
twenty years, there should not be a problem with long reliance on it. Perhaps because the court's
meaning is viewed as unclear and its opinion has been so heavily debated, few subsequent courts
have relied on it;, and most for minor propositions not germane to the issue at hand here. See,

e.g., Tanner, supra note 3 1 ; Loo, supra note 3 1 .

1 940

CA R D OZO LA W RE VIE W

[Vol.

30:5

divorce.94 Some have argued that divorce should not effect a reduction
of the property available to creditors, as they are not parties to the
action.95 Due Process and other constitutional concerns are imp l icated
when divorce prejudices non-party creditors. 96 Some further argue that
the necessity of a divorce judgment that is definitive and finally settles
claims must trump a creditor' s ability to continue pursuing the former
community property of a nondebtor spouse, perhaps even years after
j udgment of divorce is rendered, unless that spouse was allocated the
debt in the judgment of divorce.

Absent some cutoff of liability, the

allocation of debts by the divorce court is virtually meaningless.97
On the other hand, narrow rules of post-termination creditor access
such as those applied i n California and Idaho are occasionally lauded as
j ust for the nondebtor spouse, typically with an admonition that "the
purposes of community property law are not solely to improve a
creditor's position, but are intended rather to provide a fair and balanced
interest in the protection of creditors and of the nondebtor spouse. "98
Subjecting a nondebtor to the perpetual fear o f seizure for a debt she did

94

See, e.g. , Tanner, supra note 3 1 ; Loo, supra note 3 1 ; REP PY & SAM1JEL, supra note 26, at

447.

95

Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 600 (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859 ( 1 960)); see also

Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1 005, 1 009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 995); Donnell v. Donnell,
567 So. 2d 1 1 43 (La. Ct. App. 1 990); Broadway Drug Store of Galveston, Inc. v. Trowbridge,
435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 968).
96 See Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 604 ( 1 990) (noting that creditors' rights advocates may find
the rule "overburdensome and []

an

unconstitutional restraint on creditors' rights").

But see

Arneson v. Arneson, 227 P.2d 1 0 1 6, 1 0 1 7 (Wash. 1 95 1 ) ("[T]here is no due process of law in a
di vorce action as to the rights of creditors of the spouses. The judgment can neither conclusivey
[sic] determine their rights, nor be made available on their behalf as a basis for any of the
provisional remedies.").
In In re Chenich, 8 7 B . R. 1 0 1 , 1 06 (BAP 9th Cir. 1 988), the bankruptcy trustee argued that
California's enactment of what is now section 9 1 6 retroactively abolished his right to enforce a
valid debt and that the abolition was a vio lation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The court found that the trustee failed to meet his burden to show that the legislature acted
arbitrarily. Id. According to the court, the legislature had not acted arbitrarily in creating a quick
transition period away from a collection scheme it found "unsound. " Id. at 1 06 ("A generalized
statement that because creditors would be deprived of payment their due process rights are
violated . . . is not good enough . . . to carry the burden o f proof that the legislature acted
arbitrarily and irrationally . . . . ").

However, the Chenich court addressed itself only to the

effective date of section 9 1 6 and whether it could affect obligations not yet enforced, rather than
to the constitutionality of the deprivation in general.
Tanner notes that there can be no vested rights in community property for an unsecured
creditor that fails to either get both spouses' signatures or obtain a judgment and a writ o f
attachment against specific property. Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 609. W i thout a right in a spe c i fic
piece of property. it seems unlikely that it can be a constitutional violation to deprive a creditor of
the right to seize certain property by allocating it to the nondebtor spouse i n a divorce proceeding.
See also 111

re Clte11ich, 8 7 B.R. at I 05 (noting that the California rule was passed with the
due
process rights of the nondebtor spouse, rather than those of the creditors, i n mind).
97 Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 60 I .

98 Tanner. supra note 3 1 . at 605; see also Loo, supra note 3 1 , at 797-98 (arguing the
anomalous Idaho rule should be the law in all community property j urisdictions) .
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not incur is difficult to consider just.99
I have certainly argued elsewhere that the community property
regime as it stands today is far too creditor-friendly, and on the merits, I
tend to favor the California and Idaho rules as most equitable to the
nondebtor spouse. 10° Creditors certainly do not need more protection
from the marital property regime in the form of perpetual access to the
entirety of the former community property. 1 01 The issue in this context,
however, is really not whether the rule is a sound one on the merits;
rather, courts and policy-makers should acknowledge that, regardless o f
whether they view post-dissolution creditor access limitations to b e
sound p olicy, the rules act as a n incentive to divorce.
should be explored.

Its effects should be studied.

expressing concern about the rule.
incentive should be explored.

This incentive

Courts should be

Safeguards to protect against the

Yet no California or Idaho court or

legislative body has done that.
Policy-makers certainly should not overindulge in the worry that
mass divorces will result from post-termination collection rules like
those in California and Idaho. Divorce cannot act as an absolute shield
from creditors and even the California and Idaho rules will not always
insulate the former community property of the nondebtor spouse.
Almost every state now has rules designed to prevent fraudulent
transfers or conveyances, 1 02 and several states have interpreted these
rules to extend to transfers incident to divorce. 1 0 3 Thus, if spouses
engage in "actual fraud," meaning they divorce and enter into a property
settlement agreement for the purpose of delaying or defrauding their
creditors, the fraudulent transfer rules should allow the creditor to seize
the former community property in the hands of the debtor spouse by

99 "Subj ecting a former spouse to this continuous fear years after the marriage has been
terminated raises the issue ofunconscionability." Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 605-06.

1 00 See generally Carroll, supra note 29.
I O I Id.

1 02

Elaine A. Welle, ls it Time for Wyoming to Update Its Fraudulent Conveyance Laws?, 5

WYO. L. REV. 207, 228 (2005) (noting that by 2005, over 42 states had enacted the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act).

A listing of the states that have adopted UFTA, and the statutory

provisions for those states, is available from the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University.

See Legal Information Institute, Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, http://www.law
.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7 .html#frtra (last visited Jan. 1 3 , 2009).

1 03 See Estes

v. Titus, 73 1 N.W.2d 1 1 9 , 1 27-128 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Filip v. Bucurenciu,

28 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (fraudulent transfer statute extends to divorce property
settlements in both California and Nevada); Dowell v. Dennis, 998 P.2d 206, 209 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1 999); Greeninger v. Cromwell, 9 1 5 P.2d 479, 482 (Or. Ct. App. 1 996); Kardynalski v.
Fisher, 482 N.E.2d 1 1 7, 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 985); In re Hoyt, 97 B.R. 730 (Banl<r. D.Co1U1. 1 98 9 )
(Bankruptcy Code and Connecticut' s Fraudulent Transfer Law extend t o transfers incident to
divorce); In re Fordu, 201 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 1 999) (bankruptcy court can avoid a transfer
between spouses pursuant to a divorce decree). See generally Amanda Barkey, Note, The

Application of Constructive Fraud to Divorce Property Settlements: What's Fraud Got to do With
it?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 221 (2006).
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Fraudulent transfer rules a so

protect creditors against "constructiv e fraud" by the spouses, which
_
Specifically,

would require less subjective proof of malicious intent.

the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) recognizes as fraudulent
any transfer, including one pursuant to a divorce settlement that is made
"without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer" if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the tran sfer or

became insolvent as a result thereo f. 1 05
recognize

transfers

made

Courts have been reluctant to
divorce

to

pursuant

settlements

as

constructively fraudulent, however, for a number of reasons, most of
which relate to complications that arise from the requirement o f proving
lack of "reasonably equivalent value. " 1 06 A number of courts, at least in
the bankruptcy context, have found issue preclusion an obstacle to a
new court determining whether a transfer is fraudulent.

The problem

these courts have identified is that the central issue in a fraudulent
transfer case-the equity of the trans fer-is one on which a divorce
court has already ruled. 1 o7 Other courts have held that a court reviewing
a divorce settlement for purposes of determining whether it violates the
UFTA can avoid facing issue preclusion by merely making a "surface
determination" that the parties ' settlement was within the range that

would have resulted from litigation. 1 0s

In short, the application of the

UFTA in the divorce context, at least where there is no clear proof of
actual fraud, is murky. These rules cannot be relied upon to set aside a
large number of transfers made pursuant to divorce settlements.
Moreover,
advantage

of

the
the

couples

we

should truly worry

creditor-restrictive

about

post-termination

taking

rules

in

jurisdictions like California and Idaho are not those who desire to stay
in a committed relationship but choose divorce for its advantages and
are able to escape fraudulent transfer rules.

Rather, it is the no-doubt

more common situation of ambivalent spouses1 09 that best demonstrates
the troubling nature of the incentives some p ost-termination creditor
collection rules provide.

For many of these fringe couples, divorce is

1 04 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act ( UFTA) § 4(a)( l ) (2005). See. e.g. , Mejia v. Reed, 74
P.3d 1 66 (Cal. 2003) (recognizing that application of the UFTA to
divorce settl ements
complicates them and undem1ines the finality of divorce judgments
, but applying the Act
nonetheless) .
105 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UF TA ) § 5 ( a) (2005).
1 06 In re Sorlucco, 68 B . R.
748, 753-754 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1 986) ( not ing that although it
is clear
that a transfer with mtent to defraud could be challenged, it is
not so clear that a challeng e would
surv1ve m a case mvolving no actual intent). But see In re
Fordu, 201 F.3d 693 ( 6th Cir. 1 999); In
.
:e Stms on, 364 B.R_. 278 (Bankr. W.D.Ky. 2007) (both cases casting doubt on
Sorlucco insofar as
_
It question
s the ability of the court to set aside a constructive transf
er).
107 Barkey, supra note 1 03
, at 23 1 -232.
108 Id. at 234.
Sherman, supra note 1 7 , at 396-97 (arguing
that prenuptial agreements with sunset
provts1ons can goad an "ambivalent spouse" into divorc
e proceedings) .
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not a simple, black-and-white choice that is made overnight. It is,
instead, an agonizing and lengthy process that involves the evaluation of
a number of factors weighing both in favor of and against the decision.
The relevant concern in this context is that the draw of the ability to
escape liability from debts a spouse incurred (and for which community
property could have been seized) either during or even before the
marriage is almost irresistible. Divorce becomes an infinitely more
attractive option with such a creditor collection rule. 1 1 0 The rule tips the
scales in a way that a marital property rule should not. 1 1 1
It may be tempting to reject divorce incentives as insignificant, at
least absent evidence of a causal link between divorce and post
termination creditor access rules. Community property jurisdictions
have failed to ignore such incentives in other, similar contexts, however.
Indeed, a number of community property jurisdictions created a rule
allowing full seizure of the entirety of married spouses' community
property for a premarital debt incurred by just one of the spouses,
precisely because of the negative incentives the contrary rule would
offer. 1 1 2 The equity of holding a spouse's share in community for the
payment of the other's antenuptial debt, likely not connected in any
conceivable way to the marriage, is difficult to support.
But
jurisdictions which have passed rules allowing liberal seizure of
community property for premarital debts have done so because they felt
it was the only way to stop the practice of "marital bankruptcy. " 1 1 3
The unacceptable incentive at issue in the "marital bankruptcy"
context was not that divorce could situate a spouse more favorably vis
a-vis a creditor, but rather that marriage might. Early in the American
experience with the community property regime, the notion of seizure
of community property for the premarital debts of one of the spouses
1 1 O See generally Gary R. Stenzel & Jeff Banks, Defunct Marriage: Its Possible Application in
Idaho Divorce Law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 725, 727-733 ( 1 994) (arguing that Idaho 's failure to
provide rules for accumulation of property and debt during a period when spouses are still
married but living separate and apart creates equitable problems that can be avoided by divorce).
I I I Some would argue that marriages involving an ambivalent spouse are not worthy of legal
focus and protection.
[L]egal control of marriage has no call to deal with hypothetical fungible legal spouses
seen in the flattering mirror of the ought-to-be. Its business is with people as they are.
Its first premise should be that the weak, the overbearing, the nasty, the selfish-those
who have failed of decent effort to make a marriage go--are least likely prospects to
rear well because of mere compulsion to stay in unsatisfactory marriage.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II-The Decay of the Traditional Marriage

Pattern, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 284 ( 1 933). See also Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of
Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L. J. 1435, 1 435 ( 1 998). A contrary view is set out, infra, Part IV.
1 1 2 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007); Action Collection Services v. Seele, 69 P.3d 1 73,

1 78 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 9 1 0(a) (West 2004).

1 13

This practice also became known as the $2 bankruptcy, a phrase signifying the debt

insulation effect that could come merely from obtaining a $2 marriage license. See Carroll, supra
note 29, at 8-9 (citing Hines v. Hines, 707 P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 985); Schilling v.
Embree, 575 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 977).
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was virtually unheard of. l 1 4

That rule changed in some of the

community property jurisdictions, and the reason it changed is that
spouses could effectively contract marriage for the purpose of bettering
their position with regard to creditors. 1 15 A person with hefty premarital
debts could simply marry, and because the entirety of the spouses '
community property could not then be seized for debts incurred before
marriage, his creditors would be largely frustrated. 1 1 6

The marriage

essentially afforded a cheap and simple avenue mirroring bankruptcy.
The notion that escaping creditors might be an incentive to marry
has been taken very seriously in community property law.

Ironically,

both California and Idaho have used the possibility of the marital
bankruptcy as the rationale for allowing creditor access to community
property for premarital debts. 1 17

The alternative-allowing creditor

escaping behavior to provide an incentive to marry-was simply viewed
as unpalatable. It is odd that some rules of creditor collection, namely
those involving seizure for premarital debts, have been created in such
an incentive-focused way-assuming that spouses act (i.e., choose to
marry) in part based on those incentives-while others, namely post
dissolution seizure rules that have exceptionally similar incentives,
would be ignored in the divorce context.

The incentives are similarly

strong and similarly egregious. We must take the idea that spouses may
divorce to gain insulation from creditors as seriously as we take the
notion that they may marry to insulate themselves, and adequate steps
should be taken to prevent not just the latter, but also the former
occurrence.

11.

THE LACK OF A MECHANISM FOR UNILATERALLY TERMINATING A
COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIME

Once the bond of the community property regime is established,
most jurisdictions provide no means of escape absent divorce.

The

spouses w i l l share as partners in the community property they have
accumul ated.

Each has an ownership i nterest in the entirety of the

1 1 4 W I L LIAM Q. DE F U N
I A K & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
3 7 2 ( 2d ed. 1 97 1 ) ; sl'e also Carroll. supra note 29, at 8.
1 1 5 See. £\� . Recent Developmen
ts, Co1111111111ity Property-A ntenuptial Debts-Eliminating

!111m11111tr of Eum111g.1· and A crn11111/atio11s o( Dehtor Spouse-R. C. W. 26. 1 6.200 as Amended
by
Ch. 1 2 1 . Lm1s of I Y69. !st Extraordinarr Session. 45 WASH. L. REV. 1 9 1 , 1 92 ( 1 970)· see
also
'
Carro l l . supra note 29. at 8 .
116

117

Carroll. supra note 2 9 . at 8 .

Sl'e Carol S . Bruch. Ma11age111rn t Po11·ers and Dlllies Under California 's Community
.
Propern· Lml'.I : Rffom111e11datw11.1· .for Reform,
34 HASTINGS L. J. 227, 247-48 ( 1 98 2 ) ; Carroll,
supm n o te 29. at 9 .
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community property . 1 1 8 And the spouses "share " in the management of
community property as well; the essence of the basic management
scheme in all of the American community property states is that each
spouse, acting alone, may manage community property on behalf of
both spouses.1 1 9 Moreover, except in the case of a few serious
transactions, one spouse may act in a way that binds the entirety of the
spouses' community property, and not just the acting spouse' s share. 1 2 0
The existence of a community property regime, then, can lead to some
rather serious disadvantages for a spouse who did not take steps to
contractually avoid the regime before marriage and yet finds himself
married to a spendthrift. 1 2 1 The spouses together may execute a
1 1 8 Mark Patton, Quasi-Community Property in A rizona: Why Just at Divorce and Not Death?,
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 67, 1 68 (2005).
1 1 9 See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 345-46.
1 20 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-2 1 4(B) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § l I OO(a) (West 2007); IDAHO
CODE § 32-9 1 2 (2007); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3 - 14(A) (2007);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 1 23.230 (2007); wASH. REV. CODE § 26. 1 6.030 (2007). Although most
states operate under an equal management scheme, several states have categories of property that
are exempted from that scheme in some form. For example, spouses are generally required to
concur in the sale or encumbrance of immovables (or real property). ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 252 1 4(C)( l ) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1 l OO(c) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE § 32-9 1 2 (2007); LA.
C!V. CODE ANN. ART. 2347 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-13 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(3)
(2007). Also, a spouse that operates a business enterprise over which he has primary control is
generally afforded sole and/or exclusive control over that enterprise. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1 IOO(d)
(West 2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2350 (2007).
l 2 1 Community property states generally allow spouses to assert claims for damages against
each other for certain egregious acts of mismanagement, even if the complained-of activity is that
which one spouse may undertake alone under an equal management scheme. The legal standard
for recovering these damages is often rather onerous, however, as the rules are designed to avoid
familial litigation and to relieve courts of the burden of examining every transaction made by both
spouses over the course of a long marriage. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 407-08. In
Louisiana, for instance, a spouse may only recover damages from the other for fraudulent or bad
faith management of community property. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (2007). Management
decisions which unintentionally harm a spouse's interest, and even those made from purely self
interested motives without regard to the likelihood that the other spouse's interests will be
prejudiced, are not sufficient to make the managing spouse liable in damages. See generally
Aymond v. Aymond, 758 So. 2d 886, 890-9 1 (La. Ct. App. 2000). Similarly, Wisconsin merely
requires a spouse to act in "good faith" in managing community property. WIS. STAT. ANN. §
766. 1 5 (West 2007). See Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership:
Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
367, 383 ( 1 998) (discussing the difference between acting in "bad faith" and not acting in "good
faith"). Both of these states, then, would impose damages for few acts of mismanagement, at
least as compared with states which impose a fiduciary duty on spouses. See, e.g., Mezey v.
Fioramonti, 65 P.3d 980, 989 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (statutory rights to act with respect to
community property remain subj ect to a fiduciary duty to the other spouse with respect to that
property); Roselli v. Rio Cmtys. Serv. Station, Inc., 787 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1 990) (spouses'
management of community property subj ect to a fiduciary duty to the other spouse); Streich,
supra, at 3 6 8 n.2 (calling for clarification of the fiduciary standard between spouses); Kelly
Kromer Boudreaux, Comment, So You 've Married a Mismanager: The Inadequacy of Louisiana
Civil Code Article 2354, 68 LA. L. REv. 2 1 9 (2007) (arguing for a stricter standard of
management during marriage in Louisiana (as compared to California's fiduciary duty standard)
that would make spouses more accountable for acts of mismanagement). Moreover, it is unlikely
that a spouse in any community property state, regardless of the standard which must be met to
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postnuptial agreement terminating their legal regime and establishing a
regime of separation of property. 1 22 But such an agreement would
require the consent of both spouses.1 2 3 If a mismanaging spouse d? es
not desire a separation of property, divorce may seem the only option
for the other spouse to protect his interest.1 24
Theoretically, there is an alternative to divorce for a spouse in this
situation, who desires to maintain the marital bond-a

unilateral

method of terminating the community property regime, yet remaining
married.

That remedy is the j udgment of separation of property.

If

well-designed and well-applied, a j udgment of separation of property
might provide a useful alternative to divorce.

Unfortunately, it is

sanctioned by far too few of our American community property
states. 1 2s Moreover, even in the states that do recognize a spous e ' s right
to obtain a j udicial separation of property, the remedy is not as simple
and useful as it should be.

A.

The Origin of the Judgment of Separation ofProperty

The j udgment of separation of property originated in Roman
law , 1 26 even though the Romans did not h ave a marital property scheme
akin to a community property regime. 1 27 Under ancient Roman law, the
property a wife brought into marriage-her dowry-was managed by

will be able to recover signifi cant damages from a spendthrift to protect her
Th e same acts of m ismanagement which give rise to a claim for d amag es are l ikel y to
result in the near-complete depletion of the mi smanag ing spouse's assets. The availability of a
damages remedy . then, is ineffective in solving the problem of unilateral mismanagement that is
inherent in an equal management scheme.
1 2 2 C arro ll , supra note 29, at 27-28.
l 2.l More ove r. courts will not al ways honor such agreements. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra
note 2(1, a t 33-35.
l 2 -I Some have proposed modification of the equal management scheme i n community
property jurisdictions to rem e dy these prob le ms. See generally Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her
01rn: The Case Against Joint Bunk A ccounts. 16 TEX. J . WOMEN & L. 45 (2006) . Other scholars
have argued that ··the answer is not in leg i sl at i on that would limit the rig hts of creditors or the
rights of women and m e n in marriage to equal management and co n tro l .
8ASSE1T, supra note
38. Makin!_! management rules more stringent and i n cre as i n g j ud ic i al review of spou sal activities
m a y serve to increase spousal anxiety over ma nage m en t issues. "If worries about j ud i c i al second
guessing strike before marriage becomes troubled. they may lead to separat ion of property; if
after trouhlcs begin, they may e x pe di te divorce."
W.T. Tete, A Critique of the Equal
Mc111llg!'ll1<!11l Act o/ 1 '1 711. 39 LA. L. RFV. 4 9 1 . 5 44 ( 1 97 9 ) .
1 2 5 L \ . Cl\'. CODE A N N . art. 2374(A) (2007 ); WIS. STAT. A N N .§766. 70 ( West 2007).

recover damages,
intcn.:sts.

"

l 2 h Dl< i . 24 . 3 .24 ( U lpian. Ad Edictum 3 3
) ; see also MARCEL PLANIOL. 3 TREATISE ON THE
C 1 \· 1 1 LAW. No. 1 1 6 1 ( L o u is i ana State Law Institute trans., 1 938) ( 1 959); Walter Loewy, The

.\i1t111ish Co1111111111in· of A n1uets and Gai11.1· and its Adoption and Modification by the State of
Co/i/im1ill. I CAI.. L. REV. 32, 3 7-38 ( 1 9 1 2) (discussing the Spanish combination of the

co111 muni1y o f acqucts and g a i n s and the Roman dowry system).
1 2 7 W i l l iam Wirt Howe.
The Co1111111111itr llf Acquests and Gains. 12 YALE L.J. 2 1 6, 2 1 6
( 190J )
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her husband. 1 2 s A wife was simply incapable of administering her own
property. 1 29 The wife maintained an interest in the eventual return of
that dowry throughout the existence of the marriage, however, and i f
she reasonably feared that her husband's mismanagement put her right
to the return of that dowry at risk, Roman law allowed her to seek
restitution of the dowry even while the marriage continued. 1 30
The basic idea behind that right to seek restitution of dowry for a
husband' s mismanagement was accepted by later societies operating
under the community property regime, including both Spain and
France, 1 3 1 and the idea has manifested itself in the form of a j udgment
of separation of property, at least since the late sixteenth century . 1 32
French

law provides

the

clearest example

of the
persistence of the judgment of separation of property. 1 33

evolution

and

The notion that a spouse could unilaterally seek and obtain, with
court

approval,

a

separation

of property

during

marriage

was

necessitated by the head and master scheme that persisted in France,
and all other community property regimes, until the 1 980s. 1 34 In the
community property context, it was a way for a wife, and a wife only, 1 35
1 28 DIG. 23.3 .7.3 (Ulpian, Sabinus 3 1 ) ; Ernst Levy, Reflections of the First "Reception " on
Roman Law in Germanic States, 48 THE AM. HIST. REV. 20, 27 ( 1 942).

1 29 Id. at 27.
1 30 DIG. 24.3.24 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 33); see also PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 6 1 .
1 3 1 Las S iete Partidas Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law XXIX; 1 804 French C . C IV. art. 2425; see also

PLANIOL,

supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 6 1 ; Loewy, supra note 126, at 34 ("[T]he influence of Roman

Law may be found throughout the history of Spanish law"); Julie Hardwick, Seeking Separations:

Gender, Marriages, and Household Economies in Early Modern France, 21 FRENCH HIST.
STUD., 1 57, 1 5 8 ( 1 998) (detailing the 1 67 4 request of Marye Lechou for a separation of property
from her husband because he wasted her dowry of200 livres).

l 32

Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 , at 1 62 (noting a petition for separation of property filed in the

Natais, France court between 1 59 8 and 1 6 10).

Hardwick also notes that in the late sixteenth

century, two petitions for separation of property were made by husbands, one because he had
been "imprisoned" for his wife's debts.

1 33

Id.

The judgment was a possibility under French customary law for centuries before it was

incorporated into the first French Code Civil. Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 , at 1 60 (describing the
judgment of separation of property in Burgundian and Breton customary law).
French law distinguished between a separation of property (separation de biens) and a
physical separation (separations de corps et de biens).
PATRIARCHY,

111

(Pa.

State

Univ.

Press

JULIE HARDWICK, THE PRACTICE OF

1 998); see also RODERICK PHILLIPS, FAMILY

BREAKDOWN IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE, 133 (Oxford Univ. Press 1 9 80). When a

French court granted a petitioning spouse a separation of property, that j udgment did not provide
an authorization for the spouses to enter different households.

The spouses were to remain

together, with the wife gaining only the ability to administer her property. Hardwick, supra note
1 3 1 , at 1 6 1 .
Modem Spanish law also retains the concept of such a judgment for acts of "fraud,
damage, or danger" to the community interest of the other spouse. See CODIGO CIVIL art. 1393,

available at http://civil.udg.es/normacivil/estatal/CC/4T3 .htm.
1 34 Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 1 04 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 1 2 5
(2004).

1 35

Harriet S. Daggett, The Wife 's Action for a Separation of Property, 5 TUL. L. REV. 55, 5 7

( 1 93 1 ) . In an early Louisiana case, a husband petitioned for separation o f property, arguing that
wife was not contributing to the community and had become a "helpless burden."

Hotard v.
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and was subj ected to her

husband's whims as "head and master" of their community to ensure
that her dowry would not be squandered136 and that future acquisitions
would remain available for her support.137

With a judgment of

separation of property, a wife could terminate the community property
regime and seek immediate payment of the debt her husband owed to
her. 1 38 The purpose of the judgment was "to take away from the
husband any means of jeopardizing the property of his wife," and the
mechanism whereby the judgment did that was to abolish the existing
community regime between the spouses and to replace it with "a system
in which the husband has no power over his wife ' s property"-a regime
of separate property . 1 39
The French standard for proving entitlement to a judgment of
separation of property has always been rather vague.

Historically, the

wife was required to prove that "the disorder of the husband' s affairs"
gave cause for concern that his estate may not be sufficient to meet the
wife's rights and claims. 140 The husband' s insolvency, his habitual and

Hotard, 1 2 La. Ann. 1 45 ( 1 857). The court refused to grant the judgment, noting that:
It may be true that among the rude and hardy tribes of German origin who introduced
the custom of the matrimonial community . . . the wife was the equal partner of her
husband' s toil. . . .

[I]n the change of manners which a higher civilization has

produced, this prime reason for the community law has ceased to exist, yet the
institution remains. . . . [A]ll authors are agreed that the husband cannot sue the wife
for

a

separation of property, that being a privilege conceded only to the wife against

her husband.
Id Th us, it seems that courts viewed the necessity of the remedy as stemming not only from the
wife's legal incapacity to manage her separate estate, but also out of a desire to protect the weak
anJ no n- eq ual partner wife in a community regime.
means to bring the community to an end, however.

A husband was not completely without

He was entitled to petition for a separation

from bed and board, which would bring equivalent effects as a judgment of separation of

property. though the spouses would also be physically separated.

PLANIOL, supra note

126, at

Nos. 1 1 60-6 1 .
I 3Ci

The judgment of separation of property was especially valuable to a wife with a sizeable

inheritance or other fa mily property to protect.

Now, such protection is neither needed nor

afforded by a judgment of separation of property.

Under the modem community property

scheme. anything brought into the marriage or inherited by one of the spouses is his separate
property. which he alone manages and which is not bound for the debts incurred by the other.
A l� I Z . R l ·.V. STAT. * * 25-2 1 3 , 2 1 4( A ) (2007 ); CAL. FAM. CODE §

770 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE

�* 32-')0J. 904 ( 2007); L A . C I V . CODE AN . art. 2 341 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-8 ( 2 00 7) ; NEV.
R I V . STAT. * * 1 2 3. UO, 1 2 3. 1 70 ( 2 00 7 ) ; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26. 16.0 10, 26 . 1 6.020 (2007);
WIS. ST,\T. AN

.

** 766.3 1 ( 8 ) , 76 6 .5 l ( l )( a) (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.00 1 , 3. 1 0 1

I Vernon 2007). A judgment o f separation of property today protects only agai nst a mi shandling
of the petitioning sp o use ' s share in community property.
1 ·1 7

Daggett. supra note 1 3 5, at 58; see also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial

LA . L Rn . -1 1 7. 429 ( 1 984 ) .
I .1X Daggett. supra note I 3 5 . at 6 1 63
-

.

Regimes, 45

I n fact, seeking prompt execution o f the judgment was

a requirement of i t s continued effectiveness. Id.

1 .1 '1 See P J . ..\ l\ I OL. supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 83.
I .J O

French C. C 1 v . 1 8 04 art. 1 443. The evidence mustered by wife most often consisted of the

test i mony of neighbors and friends as to the husband ' s mismanagement.

Members of the

com munity were more will i n g to provide such testimony than one might expect.

"While
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extravagant spending, the sequestration of his property by court order,
and his interdiction or insanity were considered sufficient forms of
disorder . 1 41 The legal formulation of the standard the wife had to meet
to obtain a judgment of separation of property appeared rather onerous.
In practice, however, at least early in the judgment's French
existence, courts were willing to grant the judgment almost without
exception. 142 Virtually every petition for separation of property prayed
for was granted. 1 43 That this is true is not surprising when one considers
the state of family law in France in the sixteenth and seventeenth
Divorce did not exist there until after the French
centuries.
Revolution . 1 44 And even when divorce became permissible, the
possibility of a judgment of separation of property persisted, and the
frequency with which courts granted judgments of separation of
property demonstrates judicial commitment to "keep[ing] households
together" where the rift between the spouses was not insurmountable. 145
The French concept of the unilaterally-sought judgment of separation of
property, then, has long provided quite a nice alternative to divorce. 146
The effectiveness of the remedy has hinged upon its consequences.
Obtaining a judgment of separation of property terminates the
And that
community property regime between the spouses. 147
termination has retroactive effect, dating back to the date of the filing of
the request for judgment. 148 Thus, a spouse who has been awarded a
neighbors, kin, and the legal system tolerated a certain level of physical abuse, poor husbanding
of the household's resources-in terms of handling financial affairs, disorderly behavior, or
application to work--elicited negative responses from kin and neighbors, and their cooperative
testimony" was not so difficult to come by. HARDWICK, supra note 1 33 , at 1 1 2.
Contemporary French law has retained the disorder of affairs ground, but expanded a
spouse's ability to seek judgments of separation of property to scenarios in which "the disorder o f
the affairs, m isadministration or misconduct" o f a spouse gives rise t o the fear that the interest o f
the other will b e imperiled. French C . CJV. art . 1 5 80 (2008).
1 4 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, 2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, Nos. 1 66-69.
1 4 2 Requests for judgment appear to have been rather frequently lodged, and typically used not
by the poorest of French citizens, but rather by the middle class wives of urban, commercial
types. Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 , at 1 6 3 .

1 43 One study o f petitions for separation o f property filed between 1 600 and 1 670 found not
even a single petition denied (including those that were opposed). Id. at 1 62-63.
1 44 Id. at 1 58.
145 Id. at 1 75 .

1 46 Id.

Mexico is another community property jurisdiction which allows a spouse to
unilaterally petition for termination of the community property regime. To succeed in obtaining
the judgment of separation of property, a Mexican spouse must offer proof that "the notorious
negligence or poor administration of the managing partner threatens to ruin the other spouse, or
diminish the common property considerably." C6digo Civil Federal [C.C.F.] [Federal Civil
Code], as amended, art. 1 8 8, 2002 (Mex.) (English translation by Julio Romanach). See generally
Loewy, supra note 1 26.
1 47 "Separation abolishes in fact the system originally adopted, terminates the community of
the spouses, and subjects them to a new system." PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 73.
1 48 Id. (discussing the retroactivity of the French judgment) . For the rule of retroactivity in
Louisiana, see LA. Crv. CODE. art. 23 7 5 (2007). See also Harriet S. Daggett, The Wife 's Action
for a Separation ofProperty, 5 TUL. L. REV. 55, 66 ( 1 9 3 1 ) .
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judgment of separation of property would be entitled to manage alone
all of the property he acquires, to keep the fruits of his property for
himself, to acquire assets without creating a claim of ownership to those
assets in the other spouse, and to be free of the liabilities incurred by the
other after the

termination of the community property regime. 1 49

Essentially, though the spouses would remain married, their c ommunity
regime would come to an end entirely and their property matters would
be handl ed under the law applicable to ordinary co-owners . 1 50

B.

Contemporary Use of the Judgment ofSeparation of Property
Only two American community property states provide such a

unilateral mechanism for terminating the community property regime
Wisconsin and Louisiana. 1 51 Wisconsin does not refer to the remedy,
e ither in legislation or jurisprudence, as a judgment of separation of
property.

Still, Wisconsin law allows a spouse that can prove "gross

mismanagement, waste, or absence" causing injury to get a court order
terminating the mismanager's ability to manage community property,
reclassifying marital property as separate property, dividing obligations
between the spouses, and limiting the property of the nondebtor spouse
which can be seized for the obligations incurred by the other. 1 52 The
effect is essentially a judicial separation of property.

The theoretical

existence of this remedy in Wisconsin, however, has proved rather
fruitless.

Since the inception of the remedy in Wisconsin ' s

1984

Marital Property Act, the remedy has not been considered in a single
reported appellate decision.
Louisiana stands as the only state, then, in which the remedy not
only exists, but is used with some regularity. 1 53 That Louisiana follows
French law on this point is not surprising. The source of nearly all of
Louisiana ' s private law, including the marital property regime, is
French and Spanish law . 1 54 In this regard, Louisiana law seems to have

1 -19 Daggett. supra note 1 3 5. at 68 ( 1931 ) .
I 5 0 For exceptions, see L A . C J V . CODE ANN. arts. 2370-76 (2007) .
1 5 1 See J . Thomas Oldham. Mcmage111e111 o(the Community Estate During a n Intact Marriage,

5<1-SPG L A W & CONTE MP. PROBS. 99. 1 2 1 -22 ( 1 993 ) (describing the Louisiana and Wisconsin
n:mcdics as s c nsibl [ c] . . means for a spouse to limit the management powers of the other when
that spouse irresponsibly e x erc i ses management power").
1 52 WIS. S L\T. ANN. * 766.70(4)(a) (2007 ) .
1 5 3 S<'<'. e g. Cooper v . Cooper. 509 S o . 2d 6 1 6
(La. C t . App. 1 98 7 ) ( h usband granted
judgment of separation of property for wife's mi smanagement in in c urr ing numerous obligations
by signing husband's name without his knowledge ); Pan Am. Imp. Co., Inc. v. Buck,
452 So. 2 d
1 1 67 ( La. 1 984! ( husband granted judgme nt of separation o f property
for wife's premarital
cm�.:zz lcmcnt obhgat1on after creditor sought garnishme nt of his earn ings to
satisfy the d ebt)
.
u Sc<' gc11era/�1· J.-R. Trahan. T/1c Co11tin11ing il!fluence
of Le Droit Civil and El Derecho
Cini i11 the Prirntc Lm1· o(Lo11isia11a, 63 LA. L . REV. 1 0 1 9 (2004
).
"

.

.

.

�

.
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copied French law quite closely . 1 55

Thus, Louisiana' s first systemic

written body of law, the Digest of 1 808, provided that "(t]he wife may,
during the marriage, petition against the husband for a separation o f
property,

whenever

her

dowry

is

in

danger,

owing

to

the

mismanagement of the husband, or otherwise, or when the disorder o f
his affairs induces her t o believe that his estate may not b e sufficient to

meet her rights and claims . " 1 5 6 That rule was carried forward without
significant change until 1 980. 1 57

By the early 1 990s, Louisiana' s head and master scheme had
relatively recently been abolished and an equal management scheme
substituted in its place. 1 58
The entirety of the state ' s matrimonial
regimes legislation was redrafted in keeping with the new and different
regime . 1 59

Entire institutions were j ettisoned as outdated in the new
equal management era. 1 60
The j udgment of separation of property, however, retained its place

in Louisiana law even in the revision. 1 6 1 Indeed, the e qual management
scheme made the judgment of separation of property even more relevant
under the modem community property law than it had been for
centuries. 1 62 Because the equal management regime gives spouses a
great deal of power to manage the community in a way that may harm
the other spouse's interest, the judgment of separation of property
provides an otherwise unavailable method for a spouse who desires to
stay marrie d and simultaneously obtain much-needed protection from
the other' s acts of mismanagement.
Louisiana' s community property revision did alter the judgment of
separation of property, however, from its pre- 1 98 0 form. The remedy
became gender neutral, with either spouse empowered to seek it upon

1 55 Cf

1 804 French C. Civ. art. 1443.

See also (Source Notes of) L . MOREAU, LISLET, A

DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, 341 (Louisiana
State University 1 968) (noting the source materials of the 1808 La. Digest article).
1 5 6 1 808 La. Digest art. 86.

1 57

LA . CJV. CODE ANN. art. 2399 ( 1 825); LA. Civ. CODE art. 2425 ( 1 8 70). By La. Acts 1 978,

No. 627, amended Civil Code article 2425 was to become effective January 1, 1 980 as Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:2856(A).

Acts 1 978, No. 627 was repealed in its entirety by Acts

1 979, No. 709, § 5, effective January 1 , 1 980.

The latter Act enacted current Louisiana Civil

Code article 23 74(A).
1 58 Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative

Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 84 ( 1 980).
1 5 9 See generally id. (detailing the change from Louisiana' s head and master scheme to an
equal management scheme).
! 60 See Spaht, supra note 158, at 1 04-05.
1 6 1 See also Spaht, supra note 1 5 8, at 1 04 n. 1 3 7 (and accompanying text).
1 6 2 Before the shift toward equal management in community property regimes, Marcel Planiol,
in commenting on the possibility of expanding the management powers of women to rectify the
problem of excessive power given to husbands under the head and master scheme, reasoned that
the change "might result in producing two incapable persons instead of one."
note 1 26 , at No. 9 1 1 .

PLANIOL,

supra

1952
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proving a legal ground. 163 Essentially, equal management required that
the "protections previously afforded the wife against the husband's
mismanagement" be extended to the husband for the wife's
mismanagement as well. 1 64 Moreover, some onerous and somewhat
bizarre requirements for obtaining the judgment and making it effective
were removed from the law. For instance, both the old French law and
the pre-revision Louisiana law required the party seeking the judgment
of separation of property to publish notice of its issuance in a local
newspaper three times for the judgment to be given effect. 1 65 After the
revision, third party rights depend upon recordation, not publication. 1 66
Moreover, the old Louisiana law relating to judgments of separation of
property did not allow spouses who had terminated their community
property regime to reestablish it under any circumstances. 1 67 Now, that
oddity is cured and spouses may reestablish the community property
regime at any time by matrimonial agreement. 1 68 In short, what was
historically an onerous cause of action in Louisiana has been made
simpler.
More importantly, the grounds on which a unilateral petition for
separation of property could be granted were expanded substantially

16 3 Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2425 ( 1 870)

with

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374(A)

( 1 980).
1 6 4 Tete, supra note 1 24, at 528.
1 65 1 804 French C. C !V. art. 1 445. See also PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 78; LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2429 ( 1 870).
1 66 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2376 (2007).
Creditors of the spouses with rights acquired before the judgment of separation of property had
under the old law and continue today to have the ability to set aside the judgment between the
spouses if it is obtained "in fraud of their rights." Id; see also Daggett, supra note 1 3 5 , at 64-65.
1 67 Daggett, supra note 1 3 5, at 7 1 .
French law allowed for the reestablishment of the
community regime between spouses after a judgment of separation of property, though the
PLANIOL, supra note
1 26, at No. 1 200 ("Wife alone can not bring community back in operation if she thinks it

reeslablishment could only take place with the consent of both spouses.
advisable to renounce the separation.

The separation j udgment could have created a situation

which is as advantageous to her husband as it is to her; hence it can be rescinded only by a mutual
agreement.").
1 68 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2375(8) (2007).
problems.

Such a reestablishment would bring its own

The constant possibility of modification of a couple ' s marital problems creates

unpredictability and instability.
Within the marriage the continuing possibility of change from whatever the present
regime is. be 1t c ommunity or separation of property, could have the same effect as a

pebble in one's shoe-a constant source of irritation until one takes the thing off. The
.
wife, havmg
previously agreed to her husband' s demand for a regime of separation of

property. may. as she perceives her security melting away, begin a campaign for the
remst1tutmn of community. The husband, who may have initially decided to bear the
mconvemence of a community. will always have the opportunity to change h i s
mind
and begm his own campaign for a revision of the regime. Third parties dealing
with
the husband will never be able to rely completely on the fact that he is
separate in
property.
Tete. supru note 1 24. at 534.

1953
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after the equal management revision. 169 Until

1 980, Louisiana retained

the French source provision ' s language on the requisite grounds for
seeking the judgment.

That is, a wife could obtain a judgment of

separation of property only upon proof that her dowry was endangered
by her husband' s mismanagement or that "the disorder of his affairs"
made her fear that his estate may not suffice to meet his legal duty to
her . 1 10 Essentially, the wife was required to prove that her husband was
in a state of "financial embarrassment."
exceeding assets was enough. 1 7 1

The existence of liabilities

Further, a wife ' s s howing "that her

husband had suffered heavy losses (of slaves) and that the financial and
economic conditions of the c ountry were in a precarious condition"
sufficed to satisfy her burden . 1 72
The modem version of Louisiana ' s article departs from French law
and provides four different grounds on which a judgment of separation
of property sought by a spouse may be granted. 1 73

Two of those

grounds allow the court to grant a judgment of separation of property
incident to the filing of a petition for divorce, or after a showing that the
spouses have been living separate and apart for a statutorily prescribed
period even without the filing of a petition for divorce . 1 74

Another

ground allows the court to grant a spouse, on unilateral request, a
judgment of separation of property where the other is an absent
person. 1 75

All of those grounds are useful only for spouses no longer

living together and can

therefore

have little

effect in providing

incentives to spouses either to divorce or to stay together. One ground,
however, persists in the revision as available even for spouses intending
to

remain

together and to

maintain

all

aspects

of their marital

relationship other than the marital property regime.

Specifically,

modem Louisiana law allows either spouse to unilaterally request a
judgment of separation of property "[w]hen [his]

interest . . . in a

community property regime is threatened to be diminished by the fraud,
fault, neglect, or incompetence of the other spouse, or by the disorder of
I 69 Id. at 529.
1 70 See Daggett, supra note 1 3 5.
1 7 1 Id.
I 72 Id. at 5 9 .
173 L A . CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (2007).
1 74 LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2374(C) & (D) (2007).

The effect of a judgment of divorce in

Louisiana is retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition on which judgment of divorce is
granted. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 5 9 (2007). Nonetheless, it may be valuable for a spouse to
seek a j udgment of separation of property incident to a pending divorce proceeding, because it
may bring

an

earlier termination date of the community in the case of a disturbance of the initial

filing date because of dismissal of a divorce petition or a reconventional demand on which
judgment of divorce is granted. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, 1 6
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE SERIES § 7 . 5 (Thomson West 3 d ed. 2007).
175 LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2374(B). An absent person is a person who has no representative
in this state and whose whereabouts are not known and cannot be ascertained by diligent effort.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 47 (2007).
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the affairs of the other spouse . . . . " 1 76
With the elimination of many of the antiquated and overly
cumbersome features of the judgment of separation of property from
Louisiana law, the remedy is much improved from its pre-1 980 state.
Still, because judgments of separation of property in Louisiana have
always been regarded with a certain amount of disfavor, 1 77 they are not
used in a manner that lives up to their potential as a disincentive to
divorce. In recent years, the Louisiana courts have required rather
serious acts before granting judgments of separation of property on
The disorder of a wife's affairs
grounds of mismanagement. 1 78
stemming from her prenuptial embezzlement debt has qualified. 1 79 And
a wife incurring multiple obligations by signing her husband's name
without his consent or knowledge, resulting in serious financial disarray
of the community, led to a judgment of separation of property. 1 80 The
severity of the mismanagement in these cases indicates that rather
serious acts of mismanagement are required. In practice, the judgment
of separation of property is simply granted on mismanagement grounds
only in the most serious cases.
C.

A Callfor More Extensive A doption of the Remedy

The theoretical utility of the remedy should not be underestimated.
It provides perhaps the only means for a spouse who cannot obtain joint
agreement to terminate the community property regime to gain a
measure of protection from the other's state of financial disarray, 1 s 1 and
yet to maintain the marital bond that modern society so clearly views as
worthy of protection. 182
1 7 6 L A. C1v. CODE. art 2374(A). For cases in which this standard has been found satisfied, see

s11pra note 1 5 3 .

1 77 Daggett. s11pru note 13 5, at 64.
1 78 Numerous judgments of separation of property are granted annuall y as incidental relief in
divorce proceedings. See, e.g. . Brar v. Brar, 796 So. 2d 8 1 0 (La. Ct. App. 200 I ).
1 79 Pan Am. Imp. Co., Inc. v. Buck, 452 So. 2d I I 67 (La. 1 984) .
1 80 C ooper v. Cooper, 509 So. 2d 6 1 6 ( La. Ct. App. 1 987).
1 8 1 Daggett. supra note l 35, at 71 ('The action is available as the only method for doing away

with the community system between spouses who do not like it. . . . "). That may have been true
when the spouses could not perfect matrimonial agreements during the existence of their
marriage. Since 1 980, however, postnuptial contracts have been permitted in Louisiana. LA.
Cl\' . Com:. ANN. art. 2329 cmt. (b) (2007). Thus, spouses who agree on setting aside the
community property regime can, by simply executing a matrimonial agreement and complying
with the proper procedure (inc l uding obtaining court approval ), live separate in property. If i t i s
merely one spouse di ssatisfied with the regime, however, the possibility of entering into a
mat rimonial agreement to terminate the community property regime is of little use. A unilateral
method such as the j udgment of separation of property may be the only option.
I X :' There is some question as to the pragmatism of viewing a judgment of separation of
property as a means of keeping spouses together that, absent its availability, may divorce. Some
scholars have argued that a spouse's mere allegation that the other has committed acts o f
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With the Louisiana and Wisconsin exceptions, a legal mechanism
for a spouse to unilaterally seek termination of the community property
regime is conspicuously absent from the American community property
regimes. Remedies akin to a judgment of separation of property may be
available in community property jurisdictions to spouses who have
physically separated, and the existence of such remedies is certainly
necessary for the protection of spouses headed toward divorce. 183
Moreover, at least one community property state-Nevada-allows for
the issuance of a court order that functions much like a judgment of
separation of property when an elderly spouse is "institutionalized," for
the purpose of providing an income stream to the spouse left at home
and to allow the institutionalized spouse to qualify for certain
governmental services.1 84 Finally, every community property state now
allows spouses to opt out of the community property regime by
contract, even during marriage. 185 These methods of getting something
akin to termination of the community property regime, however, are
wholly insufficient to provide relief for the average spouses who are
still living together and do not mutually agree upon the need for
termination of the community property regime.
Quite simply, a court-monitored mechanism of terminating the
community property regime that a spouse may unilaterally seek is
needed in every community property state to preserve marriage. Such
an institution need not be created from scratch. The judgment of
separation of property stands at the ready to fill the gap in marital

mismanagement sufficient to warrant the grant of a judgment of separation of property may so
fracture the spousal bond that divorce is inevitable. "One wonders how those who are responsible
[for Louisiana's revision of the judgment of separation of property rules] envision bedroom
conversation between spouses after one has filed suit against the other alleging 'fraud, fault,
neglect, or incompetence."' Tete,

supra note 1 24, at 529. Tete argues that new undercurrents of
Id. at 499. Though no

distress in the family may even "tip the scale in favor of divorce."

empirical work has been done to record long-term outcomes for spouses who have sought
judgments of separation of property in recent times, studies of spouses who sought the judgments
early in French history seem to demonstrate no insurmountable impact on marital harmony.
Couples wherein one spouse sought and obtained a judgment of separation of property
unilaterally typically persisted in living together, and often had more children. Hardwick,
note 1 3 1 , at 1 77.

supra

For some couples, however, increased tension and disagreement about the

financial implications of the judgment, the sharing of expenses in the future, and other
uncertainties prompted physical separation. Id. at 1 7 8 .
1 8 3 See, e.g. , N.M. STAT. § 40-4-3 (2007).

1 84 NEV . REV. STAT. § 123.259 (2007); see also Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Judiciary, 65th Sess. 1430 (Nev. 1 989) (testimony of Hank Cavallera, Senior Law Center,
Washoe County); id. at 143 1 (testimony of Nancy Angres, Deputy Attorney General, Nevada
State Welfare Division).

The Nevada legislature specifically recognized the need for such a

statute to disincentivize divorce.
In the discussions surrounding the passage of § 123.259,
"Senator Wagner told of a case dealing with the division of assets where the wife was told her
only recourse to provide a division of assets was to divorce her husband of 60 plus years."
1432.
l 85 Carroll,

supra note 29, at 26 n. 1 3 0 (and accompanying text) (2007).

Id. at
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property law. 1 86 It is an ancient creation that is too infrequently used
today. Implicit in the allowance of a judgment of separation of property
is the notion that, even in community property states, "there might be
both a family and a marriage relationship without there being a
community relationship."187 The remedy provides an almost ideal
balance for a community property state. Allowing a spouse to
unilaterally seek a judgment of separation of property adequately serves
the community property state's need to channel couples into the marital
property regime the state sanctions, while still allowing them to set
aside that regime when they might otherwise have to resort to setting
aside their union altogether.

Ill.

THE INABILITY O F A SPOUSE TO
OF

MAKE A TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER

HER INTEREST IN THE OTHER SPOUSE'S RETIREMENT PLAN

When it comes to the death of a spouse, state community property
rules in and of themselves do not do much to incentivize divorce.
Rather, it is the federal government which plays the primary role in
sending the wrong message about marriage after the death of a spouse
in community. Specifically, when it c omes to pensions, I 88 the federal
rules of preemption provide some spouses with a rather strong
economic push toward divorce.
Each of the nine American community property states recognizes
pensions as an asset of the community, at least to the extent the right to
the pension was earned by the labor of a spouse during the existence of
the community property regime. 1 89 In so doing, community property
states recognize the nonparticipant spouse's interest in the pension,
which is thus shared between the spouses, either equally or equitably,1 90
regardless of which spouse is directly responsible for the pension's
existence . 1 91
This treatment of pensions is consistent with the

I �6 Daggett, supra note 1 35, at 72.
I X7 Harry M. Cross, The Community Propery
t law in Washington, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES

I N COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 1 69 (Jan P. Chann atz & Harriet S. Daggett eds., 1 95 5 ) .
1 xx T he term "pension" i n this section i s intended in its broadest sense-to signify any
retirement benefit provided to an employee, whether public or private, defined benefit or defined
contribution.
1 X<J Cyn thia A. Samuel & Katherine S. Spaht,
Fixing What 's Broke: A mending ERISA to Allow

C111111111111i1r Property to App(r upon the Death ofa Particpant
i
's Spouse, 35 FAM. L.Q. 425, 43 1 .
1 90 Arizona, Texas, Washington, Nevada,
and Idaho are equitable division c ommunity
property states. Martin v. Martin. 752 P.2d 1 03 8 , 1 043 (Ariz. 1 988); Hailey v. Hailey, 176
S.W.Jd 3 74. 379 (Tex. App. 2004 ); In re Marriage of Tower, 780 P.2d 863, 865; IDAHO CODE §
:12 - 7 I 2( I )(a) (2007). Louisiana, Cal i fornia, Wisconsin and New Mexico all provide for
equal
_
d t \"ISIO!l. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE art. 2550 (West 2007);
WIS.
STAT. A'il\. � 766.3 1 ( 3 ) ; Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 1 82, 1 92 (N.M. 1 99 3 ) .
.
1 9 1 Samuel. supra note 1 89.
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overarching aim of the community property regime-to treat spouses as
partners sharing in the risks and rewards that a life in common brings. 1 92
And, in many cases, at least, that recognition of the nonparticipant
spouse's interest accrued during marriage continues regardless of when
the marriage ends and under what circumstances. If the spouses
divorce, for instance, the nonparticipant spouse in a community
property state may be recognized as owner of her interest in the
participant spouse' s pension and may be able to exercise management
prerogatives over that interest. i 93 Death as a cause for termination of
the community property regime typically brings a similar effect. If the
nonparticipant spouse 's death ends the marriage, some community
property states will continue to recognize the interest the nonparticipant
spouse had in the other's pension during the marriage, insofar as state
law may respect a testamentary transfer of that interest to a third person
upon the nonparticipant spouse' s death. 1 94
Perhaps not surprisingly, federal law does not share the same view
of the nonparticipant spouse' s relationship to the participant spouse 's
pension. The most significant piece of federal legislation regulating
pensions, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),195
has been held to preempt the application of state community property
law,196 and BR1SA's treatment of the nonparticipant spouse is, in many
cases, substantially different than that in the community property
states. 197
BRISA operates in much the same manner as state community
property law in the case of divorce. The nonparticipant spouse's
interest is recognized, and he or she is given ownership, control, or
some combination thereof over her interest in the divorce judgment . 1 9 8
If the nonparticipant spouse predeceases the participant, however, the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted BRISA in a manner quite
unfavorable to the nonparticipant spouse. Specifically, the Court has
held that the purpose of and policies supporting BRISA preclude any
recognition of the ability of a nonparticipant spouse to make a
1 92 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 433 (describing marriage as

"an

economic partnership").

1 93 Id. at 440-4 1 .
l 94 For example, in Allard

v.

Frec h, the Texas Supreme Court held that a nonemployee

spouse 's community property interest in a private pension passed to her heirs at her death, when
her death was the event that terminated the marriage).

754 S.W.2d 1 1 1 (Tex. 1 998); Snyder v.

Tuscon Police Public Safety Personnel Ret. System Bd., 32 P.3d 420 (Ariz. 200 1 ) (share of an
employee spouse 's pension being paid to the divorced nonemployee spouse does not terminate
with the death of the nonemployee spouse).

1 95 29 U.S.C.A. § 1 00 1 et seq. (2006).
l 96 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U . S . 833 ( 1 997). Boggs arrived at the Supreme Court after a circuit

split as to the ability of a nonparticipant spouse to transfer her interest in a spouse 's pension by
testamen t. See Alabamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1 450 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) (ERISA preempts testamentary
transfer); Boggs v. B oggs, 82 F . 3 d 90 (5th Cir. 1 996) (testamentary transfer permissible).
1 97 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 429-30.
1 9 8 29 U.S.C.A. § ! 056(d)(3) (2006).
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testamentary

transfer o f her

pension. 199

interest

in

the

participant

30:5

spouse ' s

The ultimate effect of ERISA and the jurisprudence

interpreting it is to give greater rights to divorced nonparticipant
spouses in their former partners' pensions than those afforded to
predeceasing spouses.200

As such,

ERISA,

and the United States

Supreme Court ' s interpretation of its preemptive effect in c ommunity
property states, may incentivize divorce, particularly in cases in which
the nonparticipant spouse is expected to die before the p articipant
spouse.201

The aim of such a divorce would be to regain the

testamentary

control

of which

ERISA

and the

federal

rules

of

preemption deprive nonparticipant spouses.

The Ugly Result of the Supreme Court 's Interpretation ofERISA
in Boggs

A.

In its

1 997

decision in

Boggs

v.

Boggs,202

the United States

Supreme Court changed the landscape of interaction between state
community property rules and federal rules governing pensions in a
significant way.

The

Boggs

case pitted the second-wife-designated

beneficiary of a participant spouse ' s pension against the sons of the
participant' s predeceasing first wife, who attempted to transfer the
interest she earned during her community with the participant in her
w i l l . 20>

The applicable state law on community property-Louisiana' s
recognized such testam entary transfers made by the nonparticipant
spouse.204

But E RI S A governed the pension at issue in

Boggs,

and

E R ISA ' s anti-al ienation provisions preclude a pension administrator
from di sbursing funds (either in the nature of a survivor' s annuity or
monthly annuity payments that the partic ipant spouse receives when he
retires) to a person other than

the participant or his

beneficiary, unless an express exception is provided.2os

designated

The state and

federal ru les regarding the nonparticipant spouse' s ability to transfer her
interest i n a pension upon death seemed to directly clash in

Boggs,

and

the U nited States Supreme Court granted certiorari to tackle the issue of
whether

the

two

systems

could

be

afforded

any

harmonious

i nterpretation, or if they could not, which system of rules trumped.

In a dec ision that has been more criticized than lauded since its
l 'l'I

/Jogg�. 520 U . S . at 843-44.

2 o11 S amw.:L supra note 1 89. at 426 .

.:'Ill .\'<'!' i11/i'a text accompanying note 249.
2 11 2 'i20 U . S . ff
: � ( 1 99 7 ) .

.:'II.> /d at 8.'\6-83 7
.

.:'ll�

Id at X.� X .

.:'O� 29 U . S . C . A . � 1 056(d)( I )-( 3 ) (2006 ) .

2009]

1 959

INCENTI VIZING D I VOR CE

promulgation,206 the Court held that ERISA preempts the application of
state community property rules governing pensions.207

To reach that

result, the C ourt considered the language of ERISA itself, which
contains a preemption provision that is exceptionally broad: "The
provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit p lan
And even beyond the text of that
described in . . . this title. "208
preemption provision, the Court viewed the purpose of ERJSA, which it
articulated as "to provide a stream of income to participants and their
beneficiaries" as incompatible with a state law which allowed someone
other than a participant or beneficiary to acquire an interest in a
pension.209
The result was a disturbing one, b oth for the litigants in Boggs and
for all nonparticipant spouses in community property states .

The first

wife in Boggs was married to the participant for thirty of the thirty-six
years of employment that resulted in his ultimate pension benefit.2 1 0
During her life, she was entitled to recognition of her ownership interest
in the pension, which would have neared

50

percent.2 1 1 But the Boggs

court's interpretation of ERISA ultimately divested her of all ownership
rights in and control over this valuable asset2 12 which she helped to
accrue during thirty years of marriage.

Had the first Mrs. Boggs

survived, even if she had divorced her husband, she would have fared
much better.

Congress has written an exception into ERJSA' s rules

which free a plan administrator, normally authorized to disburse
pension benefits only to the participant spouse or his designated
206 Compare Tristan E. Propst, Boggs v. Boggs: The Fifth Circuit Finds ERJSA Does not
Preempt Louisiana Community Property Law, 7 1 TUL. L. REV. 1005 ( 1 997), and Julie McDaniel

Dal lison, Disappearing Interests: ERJSA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing Nonemployee
Spouse 's Community Property Interest in the Employee 's Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477
( 1 997). and Alvin J. Golden, A Preliminary Analysis of Boggs v. Boggs

and the Problems it

-

Does Not Answer, 23 ACTEC Notes 97 ( 1 997), and Tony Vecino, Boggs v. Boggs: State
Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERJSA 's Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L.

REV. 571 ( 1998), and Erica S . Phillips, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The Ramifications
of'the United States Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHO L. REV . 623 ( 1 998),
and Heather J. Rose, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-Life Cinderellas, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV.

27 1 ( 1 999), and Samuel, supra note 1 89 (all criticizing Boggs), with Meridith H. Bogart, State
Doctrine.1· of' Substan tial Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal
Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447 (2003), and Stephen F. Befort & Christopher
.I. Kopka, Th e Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 F LA . L. REV. I

(2000), and Sam H. Roberson, Supreme Court 's Boggs Decision Makes Sense, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 7,
1 997, at A 1 7 (endorsing the Court's resolution of the conflict in Boggs).
207 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 ( 1 997).
208 29 U.S.C.A. § l 1 44(a) (2007); Boggs. 520 U. S . at 84 1 .
209 Id at 852-53.
2 1 0 Id. a t 836.
2 1 1 Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 9 1 9, 920 (La. 1 978). The nonparticipant spouse is entitled to the
"portion of pension attributable to creditable service during existence of community . . . / pension
attnbutable to total creditable service x Yi x annuity (or lump-sum payment)." Id. at 924.
2 1 2 Vecino. supra note 206, at 572.
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beneficiary, to pay a former spouse i n community who has obtained a
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) upon divorce.2 1 3 In cases of
termination

of the

community

regime

by

divorce,

then,

ERISA

recognizes the contributions of the nonparticipant spouse during
marriage.2 1 4 The Boggs court found it significant that Congress made
no such exception in ERISA,

either in the QDRO provisions or

elsewhere, which allowed a nonparticipant spouse in community to
retain her interest and to control it b y testament if she predeceased the
participant.2 1 s The ultimate effect of the Boggs decision, then, i s to strip
nonparticipant spouses in community property states "of their property
rights in the [participant] spouses' pension plans, except when the
spouses divorce . "2 1 6
The Boggs decision is troubling because the court's holding that
E RISA preempts the application of state community property rules
regarding testamentary transfers by nonparticipant spouses "creates an
absurd dichotomy between marriages that end in divorce and marriages
that end

by

death."2 1 7

The

Supreme Court acknowledged that

inconsistency, but held that "Congress has decided to favor the living
over the dead and we must respect its policy. "2 18 One might question
whether that is true. A predeceasing participant spouse is empowered
under ERISA to make a testamentary transfer of her interest in the
pension . 2 1 9
"ERISA

About this inconsistency, the Court simply noted that

does

not

beneficiary . . . does

concern

with

his

itself

with

pension

what

money

a
at

pension
his

fund

death . "22 0

Inconsistencies in treatment abound, and the Supreme Court did nothing
in Boggs but perpetuate unjustified distinctions between participant and
nonparticipant ability to control the interest each has earned under state
law and between treatment of spouses in marriages ending with divorce
and those ending with the death of the nonparticipant.
Even beyond these inconsistenci e s in treatment, the effect Boggs
has on state community property law is disturbing.

"Pension law is

2 1 .1 29 U . S . C . A . * 1 056( d )( 3 ) (2006). The QDRO
exception to ERISA was enacted as part of
the l 984 amendments to the REA ( Retirement Equity Act) to define a nonparticipan t spouse' s
community property interest i n a pension plan covered b y ERISA. Boggs, 5 2 0 U . S . at
849-50.
2 14

Id. a l 848.
2 1 5 Sc<' it!. at 847-848.
2 I <> Ph i l l ips. s11pra note 206. al 624.
2 I 7 Iii. at MS.

2 1 x /Joggs. 520 U . S . at 854.
8111 .l'l:'I.' Samuel. supra note 1 89, at 442 ("The comparison where
testamentar y power is concerned is not between a l i ving spouse and
a dead spouse but between
two dead nonpar1 1c1pant spouses. one of whom had been divorced
from the participan t and the
other had not . If_ Congress' s mtent was to favor the fonner,
then Congress has favored the
d 1 nin:cd over the und1vorce d.") .

Phillip � .

. -' l <J
su'!ra note 206. at 644-45. This is not true of a survivor'
s annuity however. Id.
.'ice a/.111 29 lJ . S . C . A. * 1 05 5 ( d ) ( I )( A ) (2006).
2 2 1 1 Boggs. 520
U . S . at 864-65 .
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federalized"221 under the Boggs court' s interpretation of ERISA, and the
result is to "unexpectedly alter[] an otherwise predictable system of
property ownership and succession under state law and, in its wake,
leave[] many married couples with uncertain future estate plans."222
Lest one think that such an effect is insignificant, it should be recalled
that there are roughly 90 million residents, "with perhaps $ 1 trillion in
retirement plans" in the nine American community property states . 223
"[T]he Supreme Court has effectively eliminated the community
property states ' definitions of property, at least as it pertains to property
interests acquired by the marital c ommunity in ERISA qualifying
pension plans" for each of those eighty million residents.224
Boggs even carries unfortunate implications for the forty-one non
community property states. The United States Supreme Court's view
that ERISA preempts the application of state law is not limited to the
law in a community property state that recognizes a nonparticipant
spouse 's interest in a pension.225 The Court' s broadly articulated view
of preemption would likewise prevent the application of all state law
regarding beneficiary designation, for instance.226 The law of several
states provides that a spouse designated as a beneficiary on a
participant's pension loses that designation, either by waiver or a
doctrine of revocation, upon divorce, even if the participant spouse does
not act to change the beneficiary designation before his death.227
Because state law on beneficiary designation may "relate to" ERISA
plans, one would expect the Supreme Court to afford to ERISA's
preemption clause the same broad reading it did in Boggs, and to find
state law preempted.22 8 Congress' failure to expressly approve of
testamentary transfers by the nonparticipant spouse was a part of the

22 1 Phillips, supra note 206, at 639.
222 Vecino, supra note 206, at 572.

223 B oggs, 520 U.S. at 840. Justice Kennedy estimated the population of community property
states at 80 million in 1 997. Id. Population estimates for 2007 by (community property) state
are: Arizona
6,33 8,755; California
36,553,2 1 5 ; Idaho
1 ,499,402; Louisiana
4,293 ,204;
1 ,969,9 1 5 ; Texas
23 ,904,380; Washington
6,468,424;
Nevada 2,565,382; New Mexico
Wisconsin
5,60 1 ,640. GCT-T l POPULATION ESTIMATES, us CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

EST I MATES PROGRAM (2007), http://factfinder.census.gov. Ninety million residents is therefore a

more accurate estimate today.
22 4 Phillips, supra note 206, at 624.
Justice Breyer questioned the maj ority's view that
Congress intended such an effect: "Obviously, Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state laws
that govern property ownership. After all, someone must own an interest in ERISA plan benefits.
Nor, for similar reasons, can one believe that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws
concerning testamentary bequests . . . . The question, 'who owns the property? ' needs an answer.
Ordinari ly, where federal law does not provide a specific answer, state law will have to do so."
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 8 6 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225 29 U.S.C.A. § l 144(a) (2007).
226 See Samuel, supra note 1 8 9, at 437-38.
227 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b )( I ) (2007), (adopted by eighteen states).
22 8 Phillips, supra note 206, at 646.
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Court's rationale for finding them unauthorized by
same failure

to

expressly approve

ERISA,229

30 :5

and the

of waivers or revocations

beneficiary designation may cause problems here.

of

The C ourt has

granted certiorari to resolve precisely this issue in a case to be heard
during its 2008 term. 230 And while the Boggs holding that ERISA
preempts the application of state law will undoubtedly not be overruled
in this case, it is hoped that the Court will shed some light on the scope
of ERISA ' s preemption provision.

Perhaps such a clarification would

aid our understanding of precisely what community property rules
E RISA preempts.

B.

State Law A lternatives

If the preemption held by

Boggs

to preclude the application of state

community property rules were lifted, nonparticipant spouses would
generally gain testamentary control over the pension interests they own
In six of the nine American
in community property states. 23 1
community property states, pensions provided by private employers
would be classified as community assets even when that classification
occurs after the community has terminated by death. 232

And

"in these

commun ity property states, it follows from the classification of the
retirement plan as community property that half of the p l an e arned by [a
partici pant spouse] during the marriage is subj ect to [the other spouse' s]
testamentary disposition j ust as is half of the community house or any
other community asset. "233

It is nothing more than the application of

E R I SA, then, that depri ves the nonparticipant spouse of the o wnership
of an asset that the principles of community property protect for her as a
result of her efforts exerted during marriage to the participant spouse.

229 flog�s. 520 U.S. at 847.

2.111

Kennedy

v.

Plan Adm'r for Dupont Sav. & Inv. Plan, No. 07-636 2008 WL 423542 , at * l

( h:b. 19. 2008).
2.1 1 Samuel . supra note 1 89, at 426.
2 -'2 Id. at 43 1 n 28. See also CAL.
FAM . CODE § 2 6 1 0 (West 2007) (abolishing California's
_
terminable 111terest
rule); Alabamis v. Roper, 937 F.3d 1 450, 1 46 1 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) (Fletcher,
.

Cin:uit .Justice. d i s se nting) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 1 426 (2008)_(by implication); Wolff v.
Wolff. 929 P.2d 9 1 6. 920 (Nev. 1 996); Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d l 1 1 (Tex. App. 1 988), cert.

cle111<'d. 488 U.S. 1 006 ( 1 989); Wts. STAT. ANN. § 766.3 1 (3 ) ( 2007) ( nonparticipan t spouse's
interest ter111111atcs at the death of the nonparticipant spouse if he or she predeceases the

part1(1pant spouse); Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 1 82 (N.M. 1 993); Carpenter v. Carpenter,
722
P.2d 2.�0 ( l\ riz. 1 986).
Fewer states would allow a nonparticipant spouse to make a testamentary transfer
of her
_
111tncst 1 11 the part1c1pan
t's pensi_on plan offered by a public employer. See also Samuel, supra
not� 1 89. at 432 n.29 ( descnb111g the rationale behind treating public and private
pensions

d i t krrntly 111 this comex t, 111clud111g that most governmental plans are defined
benefi t plans with
_

a

i�;��ro;'w rang.: of d1stnbut1on options than that possible under a defined contribution
--'-' Samuel. supra note 1 89. at 43 1 -32.

plan).
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C.
This

Proposals for Rectifying the Boggs Inequities

disconnect

in

the

testamentary

control

afforded

a

nonparticipant spouse under state community property rules, on the one
hand, and ERISA, on the other, needs to be remedied.

The Boggs

decision created so many inconsistencies and inequities that it naturally
sparked a great deal of interest in the issue.234

Still, despite repeated

calls for change by an overwhelming number of scholars in the field,235
both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have failed to
intervene.
Boggs could be overruled. The United States Supreme Court could

relax its interpretation of BRISA as preempting the application of state
community property rules, at least insofar as the testamentary control of
the nonparticipant spouse's interest goes. After all, ERISA is silent on
the matter of testamentary transfers, and state law m ight be viewed in a
light that makes it compatible with ERISA.236 This will almost certainly
not happen.

With the tenth anniversary of the Boggs decision now

behind us, the rule the case establishes, flawed as it may be, has come to
be firmly entrenched in the pension arena.237

It' s unlikely that the

modem Supreme Court, even with the turnover of two justices since the
rendering of the Boggs decision, will feel any less hamstrung by the
broad preemption clause in ERISA than the 1 997 Court did. 23 8
A more plausible solution for remedying the inappropriately
divergent solutions provided by ERISA and state community property
law is for C ongress to amend ERISA.239

A number of scholars have

called for just such a change in the wake of Boggs, and some have
23 4 Several states have created guidelines to help employees navigate Boggs.

See, e.g. ,

Marjorie A. Rogers et al ., Overcoming the Boggs Dilemma in Community Property States, TAX

ADVISER

(September

!,

1 999); Cheryl Weller, Supreme Court Rules that State Statute

Invalidating Designation ol Ex- W1je as Beneficiary upon Divorce is Preempted by ER/SA , 7/01
METRO. CORP. COUNS. 22, col. I (200 1 ); Susan M. Kayser, The Pre-emption Problem: Lower
Courts Will Continue to Struggle with Critical ER/SA Questions Since Several Cases This Term

lefi Them Unanswered, 23 CONN. L. TRIB. 16 (July 2 1 , 1 997).

2 35 Samuel, supra note I 89, at 426.
23 6 I n Samuel, supra no te 1 89, at 446, the authors suggest that state community property rules

might be hannonized with ERJSA by allowing the heirs of the nonparticipant spouse to seek
satisfaction of her share, not from the plan administrator, which would run afoul of ERISA, but

rather from the beneficiary himself through some reimbursement of other monetary claim.
237 A March 2008 Westlaw Keycite of Boggs yielded 1 ,638 results.

238 J ustice Sandra Day O 'Cormor and Chief Justice Will iam Relmquist no longer sit on the

Court.

Both Justices joined Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent in Boggs (voting to affinn the

judgment of the Fifth Circuit). Boggs, 520 U . S . at 854.
23 9 Such an amendment would not alleviate all divergence in rules regarding testamentary
control of the nonparticipant spouse. See supra notes

23 1-2 3 3 and accompany ing text. S ti ll an
,

amendment to ERISA would be a vast improvement, as it would eliminate the frustration of the
general community property policy-sharing of the acquets and gains of the marriage-that the

Boggs decision caused.
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provided detailed proposals for modification.240

30:5

Expanding ERISA's

existing definition of QDROs to include probate orders, for instance,
which would allow the plan administrator to transfer an interest to a
person other than the designated beneficiary, has been proposed.241
Narrowing ERISA ' s preemption clause is an even more popular
proposa1.242

Most scholars view the extreme breadth of that provision

as the source of the problem with
considered

in

the

United

When ERISA was initially

Boggs.243

States

House

of Representatives,

its

preemption clause spoke to "matters expressly covered by the federal
law, such as reporting, disclosure, fiduciary and funding duties, and
vesting and nonforfeitability provisions."244

This narrow clause was

consi stent with the purpose of ERISA ' s passage-to remedy rampant
pension administrator abuses and to protect employees from abuse of
this significant asset.245 By the time of ERISA ' s enactment, however,
the preemption provision had been expanded to include its current
"relation" language.246

The purpose of the change was to "prevent

litigation over the scope and meaning of the clause . . . . Obviously, this
attempt at avoiding litigation has failed.

Since the Supreme Court' s

first preemption decision [in 1 98 1 ] i t has handed down a n average of
one opinion on the subject per year."247

Congress could take steps

toward solving the problem either by reverting to the preemption
language included in the original bill,248 or by developing still different
language that narrows the domain of ERISA' s preemption of state
community property rules.

D.
What

is

The Divorce Incentive Underlying Boggs
perhaps

most

disturbing

about

the

Boggs

court' s

241 1 Two law professors' proposal for change even resulted in
a bill to amend ERISA which
was introduc..:d into the United States Senate. See S. 1 6 1 6, 1 08th Cong. (2003). The bill was
referred to the Committee on Health. Education, Labor, and Pensions, where it has remained

without am..:ndmcnt or further action.

24 1

Sanmcl. supra note 1 89, at 4 5 ; see also Vecino, supra note 206, at 625; Eller v. Bolton,
4
895 A.2d :182 ( Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) ( court amended QDRO after the death of
the
nonparticipan t spouse on an E R ISA-qualified pension).
2 42 Sl'e. l'.g. . Samuel. supra note
1 89, at 449-50; Vecino, supra note 206, at 625; Phillips,
l"llflra note 206, at 647-48.

�4·;
. -44

See. e.g. . Boggs, 520 U.S. at 861 ( B reyer, J .. dissenting) .
David G regory, The Scope o( ER/SA Preemption of" State law: A Stud
y in Effective
r ,.,/aah.1 111. 4X U . PITT. L . REV. 427. 454 ( 1 987); see also H .R.
2, 93d Cong., I st Sess. § 7
( I �7� l: l l R. RI I'. No. 93-533 ( 1 974 ) . as rep rinted in 1 974 U . S . C.C.A.N. 4639,

4655 .

-4�

Ciregory. supra note 244. a t 443.
Jay Conison. ER/SA and the language o( Preemption, 72 WASH.
U.L.Q. 6 1 9, 619-20
( I 994 ). See also Phil l i p s . supra note 206. at 640.
2 4 7 Phillips . .111;wa 11ote 206. at 647.

24"

24�

fd. at 648.
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interpretation of ERISA's interaction with state community property
law is not its arguably unfair deprivation of the nonparticipant spouse' s
ownership interest in a pension earned during a community property
regime.

Rather, a more insidious and less obvious effect exists.

The

problem is caused by the fact that ERISA, at least as Boggs interpreted
it, treats divorced nonparticipant spouses better than predeceasing
nonparticipant spouses. This disparate treatment provides a substantial
incentive to divorce.
"After

the Boggs decision,

an

estate planning

lawyer must

seriously consi der whether he should advise a quickie no-fault divorce
if a nonparticipant spouse is expected to die before the participant. At
least one author has suggested, 'Failure to present this estate planning
opportunity carries with it at least the theoretical possibility of an
allegation of malpractice. "'249 A quickie divorce may be the only way
for the nonparticipant spouse to gain testamentary control over her
interest in the participant' s pension and to assert an ownership interest
in the asset she helped to produce during the existence of her
community property regime with the p articipant spouse.
The possibility that the nonparticipant spouse will act upon the
incentive created by Boggs and ERISA i s magnified when one considers
the significance of pensions to the economic wellbeing of the average
American couple.250

The effect o f Boggs and ERISA is to divest

nonparticipant spouses in community of "their rights in what is often the
largest, single asset in the marital community."25 1

Financial instability

has long been viewed as a serious and legitimate threat to the longevity
of any marriage, and as a relevant factor in signaling the demise of a
couple ' s life together. That the rules o f marital property, not so much in
their pure state form, but as overridden by federal policy, would add to
that instability by creating an economic boon for a n onparticipant
spouse with a hefty interest in her spouse's pension to divorce is rather
surpnsmg.
Still, n either Congress nor the majority in Boggs (or any other
reported appel late decision) has expressed any recognition of the
incentive created.

Justice Breyer did articulate concern over the

249 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 444 (quoting Boggs v. Boggs Holds that a Predeceasing
Nonparticipant Spouse Has No Property Interest in an ER/SA Pension Plan, ERISA LITIG. RPTR.

Rep. 4 (August 1 997)).
250 See generally Employee Benefit Research Institute, The Retirement System in Transition:
The 2007 Retirement Corifidence Survey, EBRI Issue Brief No. 304, p. 1 6 (April 2007), available
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_04a-20075.pdf ("Almost 3 in I 0 workers say they
expect that most of their money in retirement will come from a work-place retirement savings
plan, such as a 40 l (k) (28 percent)"). See also Phillips, supra note 206, at 648 ("While ERISA
was not created as a wealth-transfer mechanism, the growth of private pensions in this country
has effectively created a situation in which pension plans are the primary means of collecting
wealth for families.").
25 1 Phillips, supra note 206, at 648.
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disturbing effect of the majority opinion in his Boggs dissent: "[I]t
would be anomalous to find a congressional purpose in ERISA-despite
the absence of express statutory language and any indication that
Congress even considered the question-that would in effect deprive [a
nonparticipant spouse] of her interest because, instead of divorcing [the
participant spouse], she stayed with him till her last breath. "252
It is certainly possible that the policies supporting a rule of
preemption be explored and determined to take precedence over the
merely theoretical-and, some may even argue, remote-possibility
that a rule of preemption encourages divorce in a narrow factual
setting.253 The policies that the Boggs court found Congress sought to
foster through ERISA may simply be viewed as more important and
more real then any theoretical concern over driving spouses toward
divorce. That weighing of interests, however, has not been conducted
by any court. The incentive to divorce needs to be either corrected, or
given express recognition in the context of a decision to favor the rule
of preemption over a rule that provides far fewer incentives to divorce.
As long as neither happens and Boggs continues to percolate,25 4 the
largely unremedied and unrecognized encouragement to divorce looms.

IV.

T H E N EED FOR A REEVALUATION O F M A R IT A L PROPERTY RULES
THAT ENCOURAGE DIVORCE

The rules described here provide clear incentives for spouses in a

com munity property regime to terminate their marriage, perhaps not
because they desire that course of action, but because it is the only
course of action that will provide them legitimate relief from some of

the harsh effects of the rules of marital property. That the government
prov ides these incentives to divorce is

disturbing, in light of the

evidence surrounding the benefits of marriage.

Economists have long

recognized the economies of scale inherent in j oint consumption to be a
s i g n i ficant

financial

benefit

of

marriage .255

Moreover,

the

encouragement marriage gives to the ach ievement of gains caused by
the spec i a l i zation of each spouse improves both the spouses' and

soc iety' s financial picture. 2sr,

2 5 : Boggs. 520 U . S . at 868 ( Breyer.

In essence, "society has a stake in the

J dissenting); see also Samuel, supra note 1 89 , at 444.
2 � -' It 11 ,11l ld he i l logical to change the rules of a l l pension plans to allow the nonparticipant
s pnusc tcstamcnta r::' control in order to remove the divorce incentive. State statutory
plans are
_
l ik e I\ tn h a1 c d i !.lcrcnt purposes than those provided by private employers, for i
nstance, and
.•

special Cllilccrns may m i l i tate against nonparticipant testamentary control here.

2 ' 4 Samu�!. 111/1/"ll note 1 89. at -1-B.

2 « ( i !WSSll .\ R D-S l l l :C l lTl'vl.-\N. supra note 1 8 . at 5 .

2 '1• Dai i d Lam . . \farriage Markets and Assortatil·e Mating with Household
Puhlic Goods, 3 3 J .

0 1 l l \\ 1 . R F S< l l " Rl T S -162. -18 1 ( 1 98 8 ) : Shemrnn. supra note
1 7. a t 372.
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stability of marriage," owing to the reduced societal burden brought by
"the financial security, emotional support, and mutual care that marriage
partners provide to one another over time."257 It is a stake that should
be protected.

Channeling Parties into Entering and Remaining in the Marital
Relationship

A.

The rule s of family law, and especially the marital property rules,
should be encouraging and incentivizing marriage,

not divorce.258

These rules can serve a channeling function, pushing spouses into an
institution like marriage, which serves such a strong social purpose, and
providing

encouragement to

remain

techniques might take many forms .

there .259

Those

channeling

The rules of marital property, for

instance, might provide advantages to married individuals that other
parties do not have . The rules might disfavor the use of competing
institutions. They might penalize parties who choose divorce.260
Those who question the propriety of the state endeavoring to guide
behavior through substantive laws often argue that the state should
remain as "hands off' as possible with regard to marital property.26 1
For those who subscribe to this view, the rules of marital property
should facilitate spousal desires and do nothing more.262

This theory

has been somewhat well-received in the family law sphere in general.
The

past

twenty

years

has

seen

a

trend

referred

to

as

the

"dejuridification of marriage," marked by the repeal of many norm
setting laws surrounding marriage and family li fe.263

It is not possible

in this context, however, for the state to act in a hands off manner.
There
party

must

be rules governing the seizure of marital property by third
creditors upon divorce . 264
Testamentary transfers of the

nonparti cipant spouse's interest in the other' s pension plan either are or
25 7 Scott, supra note 2, at 1 958.
2 5 8 Examples of channeling rules in the family law sphere abound.

See, e.g., Brotherson &

Te i c hert , supra note 7, at 4 1 (describing the messages sent by rules of covenant marriage, same

sex marriage, no fault divorce, and paternity testing, among others).

2 59 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,

505 ( l 992).
260 Ic/. at 503 .

For a discussion of a number of ways in which states have encouraged
H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-The Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 1 00-02 (2003).
26 1 See generally Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules ofMarital Property be Normative ?, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 2 6 5 (2004).

marriage, see Brian

262 Id.
263 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW, 64 ( 1 987).
26 4 Id. at 1 3 9 (family law cannot be "neutral . . . for refusing to take a moral position

is a moral
stand in itself'). See also Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 , at 289 (particularly with regard to "property
division and support upon divorce," one rule or another must be set).
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for
are not permissible. The state must either leave spo�ses to f�nd
al,
themselves upon mismanagement of a spouse, or provide a unilater
but
albeit court-supervised, means of retaining the marital relationship
terminating the community property regime. Dejuridification is simply
not an option here. Lawmakers must necessarily develop rules that
2 5
either incentivize divorce, or encourage spouses to remain married. 6

A number of community property j urisdictions have acted in a
similar context, not to disincentivize divorce, but rather to remove an
Creditor
incentive to parties to marry for the wrong reasons.266
rather
ectionable
obj
found
were
marry
avoidance-based incentives to
early on, and community states changed their rules of debt collection in
the marital context for the purpose of removing the incentives.
Precisely the same thing should happen where the debt collection rule
regarding the property available for seizure after termination of the
community property regime incentivizes divorce.
In the context of the three marital property rules described herein,
it is clear how each might be modified to remove inappropriate divorce
incentives.

First, the debt collection rules of California and Idaho

should be modified to eliminate the boon a spouse in community
receives upon divorce. A fter termination of the marriage, a n ondebtor
spouse's former community property should be seizable for debts the
other incurred during the marriage, j ust as they are if that same creditor
seeks to collect during the marital relationship. Second, all community
j urisdictions should develop a method whereby a spouse can
unilaterally, and even over the obj ection of the other, seek termination
of the community property regime while remaining married. To force a
spouse into divorce solely to obtain relief for the other spouse 's
continuing mismanagement is misguided.
Third, either the text of
ERISA or the interpretation afforded it by the Supreme Court needs to
be modified to give a nonparticipant spouse, at least in narrowly
tailored circumstances, the possibility of disposing of her interest by
testament.

Treating nonparticipant spouses at death worse than their
divorcing counterparts creates an inconsistency that should drive
thinking persons toward divorce.
Changing each of these rules might solve particula r inequiti es. Of
course, the changes might create inequities as well.267 Holding the
265 See GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN,
supra note 18, at 75.
2 66 See supra text accompa
nying notes 112- 1 17 describing the "marital bankruptcy
"
267 It ts
· certa1· n1Y possible
·
that the changes in the marital property rules suggeste
d herein might
cause more spouses to enter into matri i:ionial agreeme
nts for the purpose of avoiding the new
. · ·
rules. That pos �1b1hty
does not undermme the call for change. First, while
the rules of marital
prope� are typically suppletive rules that the parties
can contract around, there are some things
that sunply may not legally be done by matrimonial
agreement. Not all
�tates allow the spouses to set a debt collection rule that must be respect community property
ed by their creditors for
mstance . Carroll, supra note 29, at 26-37 (describ
ing varying rules in community property s ates
'

·

;
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entirety of the community property once owned by spouses for the debt
of just one even after the marriage has terminated, for instance, is not
without philosophical problem. N onetheless, the changes would "send
a social message about the nature o f marriage itself that would become
incorporated into the meaning of the institution, thus shaping the
behavior of present and future couples."268 The message would be a
It is the message that is the very core of the
communal one. 269
community property regime: spouses are in it together, sharing and
contributing to a marital partnership .
The effect of changes such as those suggested here to marital
property law would "be immediate on those already married.

As for

new entrants in the marriage market, they will be able to adjust in
advance to the change in law and will react differently after the change
in law relative to how they would have reacted if the law had not
changed."27 0 The law would be acting as Aristotle envisioned it-a
persuasive tool for shaping human conduct.2 11
Not everyone

agrees

that law should embrace

behavior-shaping function.272

Accepting this

a normative,

channeling

function

depends, in part, upon a view of marriage as not merely a private
institution, but rather a state one.273

It is perhaps easier to accept the

on whether to enforce matrimonial agreements against creditors).

Moreover, the spouses could

not by agreement force an ERISA-qualified plan administrator to pay benefits to a nonparticipant
spouse 's legatees.

Second, the reality is that very few people actually contract out of the legal

regime of community property. The most recent estimates put that segment of the population at
roughly five percent.
( 1 990s stati stics).

Divorce

Lawyers

Frantz, supra note 26 1 , at 274; see also Sherman, supra note 1 7 at 372

But see American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Su rvey
Reveals

a

Surge

in

Prenuptial

Agreements

(2006),

ofNation 's Top
available at

http://www.aaml. org/files/public/Prenuptial_Surge_ IO- l 0-2006.htm ("An overwhelming 80% of
divorce attorneys cited an increase in prenuptial agreements during the past five years in a recent
poll of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyer (AAML) members .").

However, as long as

negative social views surround the execution of matrimonial agreements, these numbers are not
likely to increase substantially.

Third, the default rule is important for psychological reasons,

regardless of how many couples opt out of it.

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small,

Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics 11{ Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW &
INEQ. 1 09, 1 3 2 (2008).

Marital property mies are "essential for facilitating trust and shaping

expectation," even if they can be contracted around.

Carolyn Frantz & Hanoch Dagan,

On

Marital Property, N.Y.U. Law Sch, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Res.
Paper no. 45, at 3 8 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=325062. The manner in which
the state sets the default rules is significant.

Frantz, supra note 26 1 , at 2 7 3 .

Here, the state has

done it in a way that favors everyone but the spouses.
2 68 Frantz, s upra note 2 6 1 , at 275.

2 69 fd.
2 70 Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Property Division at Divorce an Demographic

Behavior:

An Economic Analysis and International Comparison, American Economics Association (2002),
at 3-4.

Small numbers of couples may contract out of the community property regime entirely.

For a discussion of that possibility, see text accompanying supra note 267.
2 7 1 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 24.

272 See, e.g. , MILTON C . REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 36 ( 1 993)

(describing a shift away from norm-influencing family law rules since the Victorian era).
273 Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 , at 2 9 1 -92.

[Vol. 3 0 : 5

CA R D O Z O L A W REVIE W

1 970

channeling function of law i n the community property context,
however, which is already heavily norm-laden, than it is in other areas.
The community regime, in each of the American state s which has
adopted it, is a regime with the purpose of projecting a certain image of
marriage.274

The regime is lauded for its gains in treating spouses

equally, for recognizing the value of all forms of contribution to the
running of a household (monetary and otherwise), and for treating the
spouses as partners working toward a common goal and sharing equally
in the risks and rewards of their future.275 The marital property of the
other forty-one states cannot be

said to have as substantial of

a

normative b ackground.
From these base notions of community, it is really only a small
step in the direction of normativity to modify three marital property
rules to remove the incentives to divorce that they carry.

The change

would merely serve to further emphasize to existing and future spouses
in community that they are partners.

Creditors with whom one spouse

creates relationships during the existence of the community property
regime should not be eluded b y divorce.

Acts of mismanagement by

one spouse should allow the other a method of protecting himself by
escaping the community property regime, but should not force him to
resort to divorce.
other' s

pension

And the interest a spouse in community earns in the
should

not

be

relinquished

merely

nonparticipant testamentary transfers are not recognized.

because

The aims of

the already quite normative community property regime would be
furthered with these changes, and spouses would be channeled into
maintaining the marital relationship that so benefits both the two of
them and society in general.

B.

The Limits ofMarital Property Law to Shape Human Conduct
This is, perhaps, an overly optimistic goal.

The degree to which

changing the rules of marital property, or any other rules in the fam ily
law arena,

for that matter, can have an actual, real-world impact on

spouses is somewhat questionable.

After all, even if marital property

rules provide spouses with incentives to divorce, there i s n o evidence
that spouses act on those incentives with any regularity.276 The most
274 Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal
Transactions, 1 9
BAYLOR L . REV. 20, 2 7 ( 1 967) ("A rational process o f thought culminated i n
the decision that the
wife shoul� h ave equal property rights in marital property acquisitions. Community
of property
.
.
1s the appltcatJ.on of this
thought, and the phrase itself is merely a shorthand rendition of the
whole concept that the husband and wife are equals.").
27 5 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 428-29.
2 76 See Douglas W. Allen, The
Impact of Legal Regimes on Marriage and Divorce, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMI CS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1 9 1 (Antony W. Dnes
& Robert Rowthom
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substantial limit of the channeling function is that its success cannot be
measured. 2 77 "No one can chart with confidence the ways in which law,
customs, new lines of behavior, ideas about law,

and ideas about

morality reciprocally influence each other."278 The decision to divorce
a spouse is not a simple economic decision.

There are a number of

interconnected factors that must be considered, including the rearing of
children, living arrangements, expenses, and a whole host of emotional
factors. 2 79 Some of these factors are considered carefully and rationally,
and some are not.2 80 And if divorce decisions are not rationally made,
then the state can't meet any channeling or norm-shaping aims with the
modification of legal rules. "[M]arital property law is [just] too remote
from people ' s actual marriages to make any difference. "2 8 1
Still, devotees of the law and economics movement have long
considered the decision to divorce, like that to marry in the first place,
as a utility calculus that each individual makes.282 Parties considering
exiting a marriage weigh, if subconsciously, all of the barriers to exit,
including the financial, moral, and social cost of divorce, against the
benefits of remaining in the marital relationship.

Of course, even

economists recognize that some decisions to divorce will be made
impulsively and immaturely, by p arties without any real knowledge of
the legal ramifications either of remaining married or of divorcing. 28 3
But law and economics has morphed our view of the divorce decision
into one that is "essentially a consumer decision, one that involves a
comparison of the costs and benefits of marriage versus single li fe."284
It is possible, with such a view of divorce, to shape behavior and to
eds . . Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002) (describing the difficulty of measuring the empirical effect of
law on the divorce decision). A number of studies in the last twenty years have sought to assess
the impact of the movement towards no-fault divorce on actual divorce rates. See id.; Ian Smith,
European Divorce Laws. Divorce Rates, and Their Consequences, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 2 1 2 at Table 1 2. I (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthom eds. 2002)
(European study of impact of no-fault divorce on divorce rates).
277 Schneider, supra note 259, at 5 1 2- 1 3 .
278 GLENDON, supra note 263, at 1 3 8 .
2 79 GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, supra note 1 8, a t 9 5 ; see also Scott, supra note 17, at 42
("Withdrawal, boredom, pursuit of other relationships, immersion in career, and conflict over
finances, children, and other family may all weaken the resolve to sustain a lasting relationship
and may ultimately lead to the marital breakdown."); Slibaugh, supra note 20 (criticizing the
American Law Institute's Principles on the Law of Family Dissolution for their failure to
recognize that even financial decisions suffer from an emotional taint when a marriage dissolves).
Parties may remain in unsatisfying marriages for any number of reasons that have absolutely
nothing to do with financial considerations. Id. at 242-43.
28 0 See Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 , at 272 (spouses do not freely choose between staying married
or divorced "based on the desirability" of the rules governing each status).
2 8 1 Id. at 285; see also Weisbrod, supra note 3 , at 1 005 ("[L]aw [is] not a prime determinant of
behavior in relation to marital stability.").
28 2 See, e.g. , GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, supra note 1 7, at 44 (on the decision to enter into the
marital relationship).
2 83 Scott, supra note I 7, at 56.
2 84 Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 267, at 1 1 2 .
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promote the institution of marriage, in some small way at least, merely
by modifying marital property rules that send inappropriate messages
about marriage.
But the problem with the notion that bettering rules of marital
property will send a message that encourages spouses to remain married
is exacerbated by the fact that any rule which seeks to change behavior
is dependent upon the relevant parties' actual knowledge of the
For marital property law to succeed in a normative
capacity , "it must communicate well. "285 There is certainly sociological
governing rule.

evidence which suggests that the rules of marital property fail to meet
this challenge. Spouses do not know a great deal about the details of
divorce law.286 Thanks to popular culture, however, they know more
about laws relating to divorce than almost any other area of law.287 And
there is good reason to believe that spouses will become aware of many
marital property rules before a decision to divorce is made.

If the

marital property rules herein explored are at issue, that necessarily
means that the spouses either have some substantial debt of which
creditors are seeking satisfaction, one spouse is mismanaging the
marital assets rather seriously, or a nonparticipant spouse is concerned
with protecting her interest in the other ' s retirement benefits.

In all of

these scenarios, parties are likely to consult with a lawyer before taking
any serious action. It is not reasonable, then, to assume that the marital
property rules detailed here cannot cause divorce because spouses lack
knowledge of the rules.

Spouses are likely to hear of the applicable

rules from their estate planning lawyers, those professionals aiding them
in defending a debt collection, or others.

It is likely, then, that the law

comm unicates well enough in this area to steer parties in one direction
or another. The question merely becomes one of how marital property
rules wil l steer them-toward remaining married or toward terminating
their relationship?

C.

The Utility of a Marriage-lncentivizing Expressive Rule

Even if spouses lack knowledge of the marital property rules that
govern them and fail to act rationally in making divorce decisions, such
that no legitimate argument may be made that the state shapes conduct

�8 �

Cass R. Sunstein. 011 the Expressii•e Function <ifLaw, U. PA. L. REV. 202 1 , 2050 ( 1
996).
� 8 6 . L yn n A. Baker
& Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above A verage: Perceptions
a11cl l:.xpectalio11.1· of Divorce at the Time vf Marriage, 1 7 LAW & HUM. BEHA v.
439, 44 1 ( 1 993).
_
In tact. at least one study suggests that spouses know less about marital property
than they do
about most other aspects of divorce. including child custody and child and
spousal support. Id.
The more ··m111utc and technical'" the details of the marital property rule
are, the less likely the
rules are to shape human behavior. Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 , at 276.
:'�7

Baker & Emery. supra note 286. at 442.
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through marital property law, there may be good reason for setting aside
rules of marital property which incentivize divorce. In addition to
channeling parties into social institutions which have desirable
outcomes, law can serve an expressive purpose.288 This view of the role
of marital property law is not dependent on its ability to modify
behavior. The expressive function of law might be appropriately
exercised even absent any change in conduct resulting from the
expression.289 In this sense, the "law perfonns a pedagogical role"290
and even if its students are unresponsive, there may be value in the
message. The rules of marital property can encourage responsible
behavior.291 They can contribute to social dialogue,292 which, in this
case is likely to center around the respective contributions and roles of
the spouses in marriage. The message communicated by marital
property law, particularly in a community property regime, should be
one that emphasizes and encourages sharing and working together as
partners in a relationship that has beneficial societal effects.293
And even if all of this encouragement and dialogue results in no
change in attitudes about divorce, there is value in such an expression
itself, grounded in an individual interest in integrity.294 The state' s
integrity i s grounded in supporting and promoting the institution most
beneficial for its citizens. In the marriage context, that is most certainly
not divorce.

CONCLUSION

With the advent of no-fault divorce, barriers to exit that once

2 88 Schneider, supra note 259, at 498 (describing expressive function of law as imparting

ideas).

Many are critical of state expressionism, though expressive theories of law have been

afforded "renewed salience" in the literature in recent years. See, e.g. , Matthew D. Adler,

Expressive Theories o.llaw: A Skeptical Overview, 1 48 U. PA. L. REV. 1 3 63, 1 3 69 (calling for a
more general argument against expressivism); Scott, supra note 2, at 1 929 (lauding expressive
theory as particularly relevant in the family law context, despite its criticisms, because of the
great number of rules that are not formally enforced).
289 See genera/(y Sunstein, supra note 285, at 2024-25 (defining the "expressive function of
law" as "the function of law in 'making statements"' even absent behavioral control).
290 G LENDON, supra note 263, at 1 39; Weisbrod, supra note 3, at 994.
2 9 1 B rotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 3 4 .
292 Id. at 24.
2 93 Samuel & Spaht, supra note 1 89, at 428-29; see also Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 , at 284
(regardless of parti es' satisfaction with the changes, the state might justifiably modify the mies of
marital property to make marriages "morally better"). One scholar has described modem fam ily
law as militating quite in the opposite direction, "reinforc[ing] a pessimistic account of
contemporary marriage as a relationship involving minimum commitment and maximum self
gratification." S cott, supra note 1 7, at 22.

294

Sunstein, supra note 285, at 2026-27.
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existed in the marital relationship have been all but eliminated.295 Both
entry into and exit from marriage are now legally free. 296
people

seriously

argue

today

that

no-fault

divorce

Not many
should

be

abolished.297 On the contrary, easy exit from the marital bond has come
to be viewed as an individual freedom that should not be abrogated. 29 8
As Jong as society has an interest in promoting marriage, however, steps
can and should be taken to address the risks opened by free exit. 2 99
Marital property rules can play a central role in addressing those
risks.3oo

But they cannot serve the institution of marriage if they

encourage and incentivize divorce.
Of course, not every marriage should be saved. In exercising both
its channeling and expressive functions, family law must be cognizant
of the fact that some spousal relationships are simply "outside the
idea of marriage"30J and unworthy of protection . 3 02

communal

Lawmakers must be careful not to commit "the error of the doctor who,
to preserve the health of his healthy patients, places them on a regime
for the ilJ . "303

Before the three marital property rules herein discussed

are changed to remove the perverse divorce incentives they bring, for
instance, the effect on functional families, and not just those on the
verge of divorce, must be considered. 304
and

divorce

are

so

closely

The rules of marital property

associated

that

any

evaluation

or

modification of one set of rules without consideration of the other
brings a strong likel ihood of spousal suffering, either in marriage or
di vorce.Jos

Thus far, neither lawmakers, judges, nor scholars have

undertaken that study. And the result is a mass of marital property law
which underm ines the very fabric of the matrimonial regime it is
desi gned to support.

.:''):\ Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale o( Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce laws Can

Remedr tlw U11 i11 te11 cled Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce,

12

CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER

609, 6 1 2

( 2006) ( noting that all states had some fonn of no-fault divorce by I 985) .
.:'%

F ran t z & Dagan. supra note

297

!Jut

.1ee

267.

at

1 5.

P au l T. Davis, The 2002 Legislative Session. A Midterm Report,

71

J . KAN. BAR

Ass'N ( April 2002 ) ( describing a failed move in the Kansas Senate to abolish no-fault d ivorce for
couples with childre n ) .
29X

Frantz & Dagan. supra note

2')') Id a t 20-2 1 .

267, a t 1 5 .

I n the business context. fo r example, arrangements are open-ended, b u t the

law encourages parties to commit to these relationships by "assuring their investments are
protected if the other breaches." REGAN. supra note

272,

at 1 3 9.

The same strategy should be

employed in the marital relationship .

.1 IHl F rantz & Dagan. supra note 267, at 20-2 1 .
.1 0 I F rantz & Dagan. supra note 267. at 1 8.
1 02 8111 see Shcnnan. supra note 1 7, at 394 (arguing that even a bad marital bargain may be

better than none).
_;o_; Hte. supra note 1 24. at 54 1 .

Some believe it i s folly to object to a legal rule simply
because Its c:x1stence may cause people to alter their behavior in calculating ways. See S hennan,

supm note 1 7. at 396 .
31 l .J See Brotherson & Teichert. supra note 7. at 26 .
.10 ' Simon Cl ark. loll'. Propertl'. and Marital Dissolution. I 09 ECON. J. C4 I , C 5 3

( 1 999).
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The limit of law is important to recognize in this context.306 No
matter how

marital property rule s

are

modified, they

cannot be

structured to protect spouses "from the collapse of the emotional core of
their relationship."307

But marital property rules can operate in the

background, providing a "safety net that minimizes certain incentives
for opportunism" and encourages continuity in marriage. 3os
A critical reevaluation of the rules of marital property is needed,
with a particular emphasis placed on whether some of those rules are
justified.

At least with regard to post-dissolution creditor access to

former community property, the unilateral ability of a spouse to remain
married but bring the community property regime to

an

end for the

other' s mismanagement, and the possibility of the nonparticipant spouse
making testamentary transfers of her interest in an BRISA-governed
pension, the results of that reevaluation are likely to call for a change.
These rules do not succeed in "promoting their accepted values."309
Indeed, each of them seems to undermine the ideals of the community
property regime.

And worse yet, they push spouses, unnecessarily,

toward divorce, an indirect attack on marriage3 10 with which we should
all be concerned.

3 0 6 "[T]here is something in family law that [is] peculiarly difficult. The problem is centrally
that we care so much, and that law, finally, can do so little." Weisbrod,
3 07 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 267, at 3 8 .
3 08 Id. at 40.

supra note

3, at

1 007.

3 09 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft ofProperty, 9 1 CAL L. REv. 1 5 1 7, 1 561 (2003).
3 1 0 S amuel, supra note 1 8 9, at 442-443 (describing indirect attack on marriage as one "made
thro ugh the enactment of laws that redefine or undermine marriage or deny recognition to its
inherent nature").

